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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) (2000).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issues presented by this appeal are whether the trial court properly
dismissed Appellants' claims against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
("State Farm") on the grounds that (1) an insurer may limit or deny PIP benefits to an
insured based upon the results of a medical examination by a physician retained by the
insurer; and (2) Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute
of limitations governing insurance contracts. The trial court considered the terms of the
insurance policy under which the Appellants were insured at the time of the accident.
The trial court also considered the admissions of Appellants' counsel at argument.
Because these matters were presented to and considered by the trial court, the court
exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to dismiss as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court should review
the trial court's ruling for correctness, and "may affirm a summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Straub v. Fisher &
Pavkel Health Care, 1999 UT 102, t P6, 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this
appeal:
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359

Utah No Fault Statute:
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including
prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services,
not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1999) (emphasis added).
Limitation of Actions Under Insurance Contract:
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first-party
insurance must be commenced within three years after the
inception of the loss.

(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to
the complainant will arise from a delay in bringing suit
against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay
itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an
insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the
earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as
required under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in
which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration
procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as
agreed to by the parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1999).

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . [and] (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b) (2001).
Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
Complete texts of these statutes and rules are provided in the Addendum hereto.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts

State Farm set forth each ofthe following undisputed facts in the memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss. (R. 127-130) These facts appear in Appellants'
Amended Complaint or in the policy pursuant to which Appellants are insured.1
On August 5, 1994, Appellants were involved in an automobile accident with
defendant Maye Helen Potter at the intersection of 3500 South 3600 West, West Valley
City, Utah. (R. 127) Appellants have alleged significant and permanent injuries resulting
from this accident. (R. 127) Following the August 5, 1994 accident, Appellants' doctors
performed various tests and treatments to alleviate their alleged injuries, causing
Appellants to incur medical expenses. (R. 127)
At the time ofthe accident, Appellants were insured under State Farm Automobile
Insurance Policy No. 7477527-A29-44, policy form 9844.3, with endorsements 6082P,
6093R, and 6885EE.1 (hereinafter the "Policy"). (R. 128, 145) The inception date ofthe
Appellants' Policy was July 29, 1994. (R. 128, 145) The Policy provides that State Farm

1

State Farm filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' claims against State Farm on October
23, 2000. (R. 122) State Farm submitted a memorandum in support of this motion,
pursuant to Rule 4-501 ofthe Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 125)
Appellants did not respond to State Farm's motion to dismiss. Instead, Appellants filed a
motion to strike State Farm's motion to dismiss, and a motion for partial summary
judgment. (R. 239, 250) Neither of Appellants' motions set forth a statement of facts,
nor did Appellants contest any ofthe facts recited by State Farm. Accordingly, under
Rule 4-501(2)(B) ofthe Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, those facts set forth in
State Farm's motion to dismiss (which later was converted by the district court to a
motion for summary judgment) are deemed admitted.
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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shall provide personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits to Appellants, including the
reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by Appellants up to
$3000.00 per person. (R. 128, 153) The Policy also provides that an insured who makes
a claim against the policy shall "be examined by physicians chosen and paid by [State
Farm] as often as [State Farm] reasonably may require." (R. 128, 149)
Appellants did not claim any PIP benefits from August 5, 1994—the date of the
accident—until August 1996, when Appellants sent their medical bills to State Farm for
reimbursement. In September 1996, State Farm requested that Appellants undergo a
medical examination by Dr. Stephen Marble, a physician retained by State Farm, to
determine whether Appellants' medical expenses were reasonable, necessary, and related
to the August 5, 1994 accident for which Appellants seek coverage. (R. 128) After
examining Marian Tucker, Dr. Marble concluded, in a report dated October 22, 1996, that
Mrs. Tucker's injuries were not related to the August 5, 1994 automobile accident, and
that her injuries arose out of a pre-existing condition. (R. 128) After examining Dee Voy
Tucker, Dr. Marble concluded, in a report dated October 22, 1996, that Dee Voy
Tucker's injuries arose out of the August 5, 1994 automobile accident. (R. 128-29) With
respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one set of x-rays was
duplicative and therefore unnecessary. (R. 129)
Based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm paid all reasonable and
necessary medical expenses related to the Appellants' automobile accident in November
1996. (R. 129, 701). State Farm declined to pay all of Appellants' claimed medical
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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expenses. At the hearing on State Farm's motion to dismiss, counsel for Appellants
conceded that Appellants first learned of State Farm's refusal to pay all of their claimed
medical expenses in November 1996, nearly four years before Appellants filed suit
against State Farm. (R. 700-01)
B,

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court
Below

This case involves Appellant's challenge to the trial court's dismissal of
Appellants' claims against State Farm.
On July 27, 1998, Appellants filed a personal injury suit against Maye Helen
Potter. (R. 1, 129) On September 12, 2000, Appellants amended their complaint to
include State Farm as a defendant. (R. 16, 129) In their Amended Complaint, Appellants
allege that State Farm failed to meet its obligations to Appellants under the Policy. (R.
29-30, 129) In particular, Appellants allege that State Farm breached its contractual and
fiduciary duties to the Appellants by retaining Dr. Marble to perform a medical
examination, and by relying upon Dr. Marble's findings to determine whether
Appellants' medical expenses were reasonable and necessary. (R. 31-42, 129)
Appellants asserted claims against State Farm for breach of contract, breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. (R. 31-42, 129) All of
Appellants' claims are based on the contention that an insurer may not limit or deny PIP
coverage based upon the results of a medical examination by a physician retained by the
insurer.

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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State Farm responded to Appellants' Amended Complaint with a Motion to
Dismiss filed on October 23, 2000. In support of its Motion to Dismiss, State Farm
asserted that (1) an insurer lawfully may limit or deny PIP benefits to an insured based
upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained by an insurer; and (2)
Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute of limitations
governing insurance contracts. (R. 130)
Appellants did not respond to State Farm's motion to dismiss. Instead, Appellants
filed a motion to strike State Farm's motion to dismiss and a motion for partial summary
judgment. (R. 239, 250) In support of their motion to strike, Appellants asserted that
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may not be used to challenge the
underlying merits of a claim or to raise affirmative defenses, such as the statute of
limitations, by motion. (R. 244) In support of their motion for partial summary
judgment, Appellants asserted that State Farm may not limit or deny payment of PIP
benefits on the grounds that the claimed medical expenses were neither reasonable nor
necessary. (R. 256, 258) Appellants did not address the merits of State Farm's statute of
limitations argument in either motion, except to say (incorrectly) that this type of defense
may not be raised by motion under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 244-46)
State Farm's motion to dismiss came before the trial court on January 22, 2001.
The trial court considered the terms of the insurance policy under which Appellants were
insured at the time of the accident. The trial court also considered the admissions of
Appellants' counsel at argument. Because these matters were presented to and
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359

7

considered by the trial court, the trial court exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. On February 6, 2001, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal With
Prejudice, in which the court entered judgment in favor of State Farm on the basis of
State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied Appellants' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion
to Dismiss, and denied Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 628) The
court held that Appellants had failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit
or deny payment of PIP benefits to an insured based upon the findings of a medical
examination by a physician retained by State Farm. (R. 631) The court also concluded
that Appellants' claims against State Farm were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations governing insurance contract actions. (R. 632) The court further concluded
that Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in November 1996, when State Farm
declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. (R. 632-633) Appellants' claims, therefore,
are barred because they did not file suit against State Farm until September 2000, nearly
four years after the inception of the loss.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Each of Appellants' claims against State Farm rests upon the incorrect assumption
that it is unlawful for State Farm to retain medical examiners to ascertain the
reasonableness and/or necessity of claimed medical expenses, and to deny PIP benefits

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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based upon the results of those examinations. Appellants have asserted that State Farm's
use of a medical examination to determine Appellants' PIP benefits constituted breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and fraud.
The trial court correctly concluded that Appellants' claims against State Farm are
barred as a matter of law. In particular, the trial court correctly concluded State Farm
lawfully may limit or deny PIP benefits based upon the findings of a medical examination
by a physician retained by State Farm. Utah law does not limit or preclude the use of
medical examinations by insurers; neither Utah courts nor those of any other jurisdiction

Appellants purported to bring this suit on behalf of themselves and all other State Farm
policy holders whose coverage has been limited or denied on the basis of the findings of a
medical examination by a physician retained by State Farm. Appellants cannot establish
the requisite elements to certify a class under Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requirements include numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. Nor can Appellants meet the requirements of Rule 23(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that common issues predominate over
issues of individual fact. The unique circumstances pertaining to the injuries suffered by
each proposed class member, the claimed medical expenses, the reasonableness and
necessity of those claimed medical expenses, and the findings of the medical examiners
retained by State Farm precludes any finding of commonality or typicality. See, e.g..
Hare v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:98 CV 65, at 7 (D. Ind., March 26, 2001)
(refusing to certify class because "the possible claim of each potential member of the
class would rest on unique, rather than common, questions of fact"); Ostrof v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civil No. PJM 99-2988, at 15-16, 19 (D. MA, May 21, 2001)
(refusing to certify class because "the claims of the members of the putative class in this
case would involve distinct inquiries leading to distinct conclusions as to each member")
(Copies of these unpublished opinions are provided in the Addendum hereto). For these
reasons, Appellants' proposed class fails under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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have held such examinations are unlawful. To the contrary, it is commonplace for an
insurer to require an insured to undergo a medical examination to determine whether the
insured's claimed medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident
for which the insured seeks benefits. The Policy specifically permits medical
examinations to assist the insurer in making this determination. In Pennington v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), this Court implicitly approved the use of such
medical examinations to limit or deny PIP benefits. Such examinations are not, as
Appellants suggest, a means by which insurers wrongly deny PIP benefits to their
insureds.
The trial court also correctly concluded that Appellants' claims against State Farm
are barred by the three-year statute of limitations governing insurance contracts. Under
Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first-party insurance
within three years of the date of the inception of the loss. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21313 (1999). The accident at issue in this lawsuit took place on August 5, 1994.
Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm declined to pay
the disputed PIP benefits. Appellants did not file suit against State Farm until September
12, 2000. Because Appellants did not file suit against State Farm within the three-year
time frame governing actions based upon insurance contracts, Appellants' claims against
State Farm are barred.

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359

10

ARGUMENT
Appellants have briefed no fewer than fourteen issues for consideration by this
Court—many of which either are redundant or irrelevant. The only substantive issues
that must be considered by this Court are whether the trial court correctly concluded that
(1) State Farm lawfully may rely upon medical examinations to determine an insured's
PIP benefits; and (2) Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year
statute of limitations governing insurance contracts. The trial court properly dismissed
Appellants' claims on each of these grounds.
I.

STATE FARM LAWFULLY MAY RELY UPON MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS BY A PHYSICIAN RETAINED BY STATE FARM
TO DETERMINE AN INSURED'S PIP BENEFITS

Appellants' claims against State Farm rest on the purported legal principle that it
is unlawful for an insurer to limit or deny PIP benefits based upon the results of an
medical examination by a physician retained by the insurer. Appellants have failed to
advance any authority to show that a properly conducted medical examination is
unlawful, nor have Appellants provided the Court with any authority to show that
properly conducted medical examinations constitute a violation of an insured's rights
under an insurance policy, or a violation of the PIP provisions of any state's no fault
statute. In fact, both the Utah Insurance Code and the Policy anticipate that State Farm
and other insurers will conduct medical examinations to determine whether medical
expenses are reasonable and necessary, and therefore payable. Utah's no fault statute
provides PIP benefits to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
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medical. .. services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. 31A22-307(l)(a) (1999). Appellants' insurance policy contains language to the same effect.
(R. 153) The Policy also provides that an insured who makes a claim against the Policy
shall "be examined by physicians chosen and paid by [State Farm] as often as [State
Farm] reasonably may require." (R. 128, 149) Thus, under Utah law and the Policy,
State Farm is obligated to reimburse Appellants only for those medical expenses that are
reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident for which the insured seeks coverage.
Like other insurers, State Farm uses medical examinations to determine whether an
insured's treatment was necessary, and whether the charge was reasonable.
Appellants contend that medical examinations by an insurer are unlawful because
Utah's no fault statute does not expressly provide for the use of such examinations. What
Appellants overlook is that nothing in Utah law precludes an insurer from conducting a
medical examination in order to determine the PIP benefits due an insured. It is a basic
maxim of statutory construction that "the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of
the Legislature in enacting an Act is the plain language of the Act." Hebertson v. Bank
One, 995 P.2d 7, 8 (Utah 1999). Had the Utah Legislature wanted to prohibit the use of
medical examinations by an insurer, it could have included prohibitory language in the
insurance code. It did not do so. The legislature's silence implies that it did not intend to
preclude insurers from conducting medical examinations to determine the PIP benefits
due an insured. "It can hardly be argued that an insurer cannot investigate what
reasonably appears to be a questionable claim simply because the underlying statute
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authorizing the coverage does not mention such investigative rights." See Morris v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 287 S.E.2d 388, 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting plaintiffs claim
that he was not required to undergo a medical evaluation because Georgia's "no fault"
statute did not provide for such an evaluation). Medical examinations by physicians
retained by insurers are a necessary correlative of the reasonable and necessary
requirement of the no fault statute. Thus, even if the no fault statute does not expressly
grant insurers the right to conduct medical examinations, that right must exist or the
"reasonable and necessary" requirement would be rendered meaningless.
Appellants observe that section 31A-22-309, Utah Code Ann. (1999), sets forth
seven exclusions upon which an insurer may rely to limit or deny PIP benefits to an
insured. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(2)(a) (1999). Appellants reason that since
the conclusions of a medical examiner retained by an insurer are not referenced in any of
these statutory exclusions, State Farm may not limit PIP benefits on such an examination.
The "reasonable" and "necessary" requirements in the no fault statute, however, are not
exclusions. Rather, they are statutory predicates to reimbursement for claimed medical
expenses. An insurer's determination of what constitutes reasonable and necessary
medical expenses must be made on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely why medical
examinations are necessary. Otherwise, an insurer would be left with no choice but to
take the word of its insured or the insured's treating physician at face value.
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly approved the use of medical examinations
by an insured to limit or deny PIP benefits. In Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co., 973
GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359
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P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the findings of a medical
examiner retained by the insurer to determine that plaintiff Lorin Pennington's claimed
medical expenses were unnecessary and unreasonable. See id. at 937. Pennington
alleged that he suffered injury as a result of an accident. Because his insurance agent had
concerns about the validity of Pennington's claims, his insurer required him to undergo a
medical examination by a physician retained by the insurer. Like the Policy in this case,
Pennington's insurance policy required him to submit to medical examination by
physicians chosen and paid for by his insurer. The medical examiner determined that
Pennington had incurred medical expenses that were duplicative and unnecessary. Based
upon the findings of the examiner, Pennington's insurer refused to pay for the duplicative
and unnecessary expenses. See id. at 935-36.
Pennington filed suit against his insurer, arguing that all of his medical expenses
were necessary and reasonable. Based upon the results of the medical examination, the
trial court determined that the disputed medical costs were unnecessary and unreasonable.
See id. at 936. The trial court determined that Pennington and his attorney intentionally
had incurred unnecessary medical expenses in an attempt to collect reimbursement for the
same from the insurer. See id. This Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
Pennington incurred unnecessary medical expenses, relying in part upon the expert
testimony of the medical examiner. The Court stated that, "[u]nder the terms of
Pennington's insurance contract, [the insurer] was not required to pay unnecessary and/or
unreasonable medical expenses." Id. at 938-39.
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In Pennington, as in many other cases, the medical examination provided the sole
means by which the insurer could determine whether the claimed medical expenses of its
insured were legitimate. Such examinations often are the only means by which an insurer
may determine whether an insured's claimed expenses are reasonable, necessary, and
related to the accident. In Huntt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 527
A.2d 1333 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
emphasized this point, stating that:
[w]hile [Maryland's no fault statute] was enacted in order to
ensure prompt payment of PIP benefits without regard to
fault, this does not mean that PIP coverage was intended to
provide a PIP claimant with a blank check. Maryland's no
fault statute, like those of other states, places a control on
inflated or spurious claims by limiting the insurer's obligation
to payment of'reasonable' expenses for 'necessary' services
arising from the accident in question, (citation omitted). In
our view, it would be impossible in many cases for an insurer
to determine whether a PIP claimant's expenses were
reasonable and for necessary services if the insurer could not
require that the claimant be examined by a physician of its
choice.
IdL at 1336; see also Neal v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn.
1995) (stating that, under no fault statute, insurer is obligated to pay designated benefits
to its insured promptly, but insured is required to submit to an independent medical
examination "so that the insurer may be assisted in its gathering of information to
determine the nature and extent of the injury and loss"); Brito v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
687 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that Massachusetts no fault
statute permits insurer, where it has reason to doubt its liability, to require a medical
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examination by its own physician to assist in determining PIP coverage due, and stating
that an "insurer is not required to pay medical bills merely on the unsubstantiated
assertion by the claimant that they represent reasonable and necessary treatment for
injuries caused by the accident").
It is undeniable that the "potential for fraud at the confluence of the medical, legal,
and insurance industries is virtually unlimited." United States Sec. Ins. Co. v. Silva, 693
So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Medical examinations by physicians retained
by insurers are nothing more than precautionary measures "intended to protect insurers
from those who would defraud them." Id., see also Verhaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 7 n.3 (1 st Cir. 1993) (stating that independent medical examinations
"serve a legitimate purpose, affording the insurer a more objective accounting of the
insured's injuries or damages"). Because of the danger of fraud and unnecessary
expense, "insurance companies must be accorded wide latitude in their ability to
investigate claims and to resist false or unfounded efforts to obtain funds not available
under the contract of insurance." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo.
1985). An insurer's ability to investigate claims necessarily includes the right to conduct
medical examinations.
For exactly these reasons, courts in other jurisdictions routinely permit insurers to
conduct medical examinations, and to rely upon the results of those examinations to
determine PIP coverage, so long as the terms of the insured's policy do not conflict with
the provisions of the no fault statute. See, e.g., Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
GOLDSM A\SLC\175359
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957 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1998) (stating that the "requirement that a claimant submit to a
reasonably requested independent medical examination as a part of the claims process is
discretionary and may be imposed at any time the claim is pending"); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Eaton, 448 S.E.2d 652, 655 (Va. 1994) (stating that because the terms of the insurance
policy did not conflict with provisions of no fault statute, the policy would be enforced as
written, including requirement that claimant submit to an independent medical
examination); New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Prof Is, Inc., et al. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Banking and Ins., et al., 732 A.2d 1063, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999); Albee v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 967 P.2d 1, 4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that insurer has the right
to conduct an independent medical examination and may condition its liability based
upon that examination so long as it does not conflict with the provisions of the no fault
statute).
In sum, Utah law provides that an insurer need only reimburse those medical
expenses that are reasonable and necessary. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l)(a).
Both the weight of authority and the language of Utah's no fault statute support the
proposition that State Farm lawfully requested Appellants to undergo medical
examinations and lawfully limited PIP benefits on the basis of those examinations. For
these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claims against State Farm must be
affirmed.
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II.

APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST STATE FARM ARE BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING INSURANCE
CONTRACTS

The accident at issue in this lawsuit took place on August 5, 1994. Appellants first
incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm declined to pay the disputed PIP
benefits. Appellants did not file suit against State Farm until September 12, 2000. The
trial court correctly concluded that Appellants claims against State Farm are barred
because Appellants did not file suit against State Farm within the time frame set forth
under the three-year statute of limitations governing insurance contracts.
Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first-party
insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See Utah Code
Ann. 31A-21-313 (1999). The term "first-party insurance" refers to an insurance
agreement where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses
suffered by the insured. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Utah
1985). In this instance, State Farm and the Appellants share a first-party insurance

-2

Utah Code Ann. 78-12-24 (1999) provides for a six-year statute of limitations on
actions brought upon a written contract. Where two statutes of limitations conflict, the
more specific statute prevails over the more general statute. See Lang v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co.. 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Utah law and finding that three-year
statute of limitations governing insurance claims, rather than six-year statute of
limitations governing general contract actions, applied to plaintiffs causes of action).
Thus, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1)
controls Appellants' contract claims against State Farm.
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relationship.4
The commencement date of the statute of limitations for insurance contract actions
hinges upon the definition of the phrase "inception of the loss." The Utah Supreme Court
has stated that the term "inception of the loss" in an insurance policy relates to the first
moment that the loss is incurred. See Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Co., 21 Utah 2d
173, 175, 442 P.2d 933, 934 (1968); see also Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T. Inc.. 745 F.
Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law and holding that statute of limitations
for insurance contracts commences on the moment that the first loss is incurred).
The trial court determined that Appellants first incurred their alleged losses in
November 1996, when State Farm first declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. (R.
701) At the hearing on State Farm's motion to dismiss, Appellants' counsel conceded
that Appellants first learned that State Farm had refused to pay all of their claimed
medical expenses in November 1996, nearly four years before Appellants filed suit

4

Appellants contend that the parties share a third-party insurance relationship, and that,
by virtue of this third-party relationship, State Farm owes Appellants a duty of
indemnification. Appellants have improperly characterized the parties' relationship and
State Farm's duty to Appellants. This Court has stated that "a third-party insurance
contract obligates the insurer to defend the insured against claims made by third parties
against the insured, and to pay any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar limit."
See Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995), quoting Beck, 701
P.2d at 798 n.2. With respect to Appellants' PIP coverage, State Farm does not have a
duty to defend Appellants against claims made by third parties. Rather, this dispute
concerns State Farm's obligation to reimburse Appellants for claimed medical expenses.
Thus, under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in the Beck case, the parties share a
first-party insurance relationship.
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against State Farm. (R. 700-01) The trial court concluded, therefore, that Appellants'
claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
Appellants argue that they incurred their first loss when they began to incur
attorneys fees for State Farm's alleged breach of the parties' insurance contract, and they
rely on Canadian Indemnity to support this argument. Canadian Indemnity, however,
concerned an insurer's alleged breach of the duty to defend, rather that the duty to pay
medical expenses. The federal district court held that, in the context of a liability
insurance policy, the statute of limitations commenced when the insured began to incur
defense expenses. Canadian Indem. Co., 745 F. Supp. at 664. The analysis of the
Canadian Indemnity court is not pertinent to this matter because the parties do not share a
third-party insurance relationship and because State Farm does not have a duty to
indemnify or defend Appellants. The Canadian Indemnity case is relevant only for its
interpretation of the phrase "inception of the loss."
Alternatively, Appellants contend that the "inception of the loss" should be based
on State Farm's "unequivocal denial of'full' payment." Brief of Appellants at 42.
Appellants argue that the parties, "by their agreement, were negotiating until State Farm
positively denied payment on or about September 18, 1997." Id. Appellants assert that,
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5), the statute of limitations was tolled until
September 18, 1997, when State Farm "positively denied payment." Id.
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5) provides that the statute of limitation "is tolled
during the period in which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure
prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties." Id.
Appellants have not alleged that the parties agreed to conduct an appraisal, nor have
Appellants alleged that the parties submitted this dispute to arbitration. Appellants
suggest that the parties agreed to toll the statute of limitations while they negotiated the
expenses for which State Farm would reimburse Appellants. There is no factual record to
support Appellants' assertion that the parties negotiated payment of Appellants' claimed
medical expenses. State Farm did not agree to negotiate payment of Appellants' claimed
medical expenses with Appellants. Instead, State Farm retained Dr. Stephen Marble to
conduct a medical examination to ensure that Appellants' claimed medical expenses were
reasonable, necessary, and related to the August 5, 1994 accident. Dr. Marble concluded
that some of Appellants' claimed medical expenses either were unreasonable or
unnecessary, or were not related to the August 5, 1994 accident. In November 1996, on
the basis of Dr. Marble's findings, State Farm reimbursed Appellants only for those
expenses that were reasonable in value, necessary, and related to the August 5, 1994
accident. At that time, State Farm communicated to Appellants that it would not provide
additional benefits unless Appellants provided further information to State Farm about
their claimed medical expenses. Plaintiffs did not provide any additional.information to
State Farm. State Farm did not agree to negotiate with Appellants about payment of
Appellants' claimed medical expenses, nor did State Farm agree to toll the statute of
limitations. The trial court correctly concluded that Appellants' cause of action arose in
GOLDSM A\SLC\175359
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November 1996, when State Farm refused to reimburse Appellants for all of their
claimed medical expenses. Accordingly, Appellants' claims against State Farm are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
III.

THE DUTIES OWED BY STATE FARM TO APPELLANTS ARE
BASED ON THE PARTIES' CONTRACT AND DO NOT EXIST
INDEPENDENTLY OF THAT CONTRACT

Appellants argue that their claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and fraud are not governed by the
three-year statute of limitations for insurance contracts. Regardless of how Appellants
have characterized these claims, all of Appellants' claims rest in contract, not in tort.
"In characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action
and not the pleading labels chosen." Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). The court must examine "the true nature of the wrong and the injury as
evidenced in the substance of the pleadings." Id. Examining the nature of Appellants'
action, and Appellants' alleged injuries, it is clear that Appellants' claims are based upon
the Policy. Any cause of action Appellants may have against State Farm arises out of the
duties and obligations of the parties under that Policy.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In Beck, plaintiff filed suit against his insurer,
Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers"), for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Beck contended that Farmers had acted
maliciously toward him, with the intent of causing him emotional distress. The Court
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stated that Beck and Farmers shared a first-party relationship, and that "in a first-party
relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties
are contractual rather than fiduciary." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. "Without more, a breach
of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contract, not
one in tort." Id.
Beck recognized that other states permit a first-party insured to institute a tort
action against an insurer who fails to bargain in good faith, but stated that
the tort approach adopted by these courts is without a sound
theoretical foundation and has the potential for distorting
well-established principles of contract law. Moreover, the
practical end of providing a strong incentive for insurers to
fulfill their contractual obligations can be accomplished as
well through a contract cause of action, without the analytical
straining necessitated by the tort approach, and with far less
potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts.
Id at 799.5 See also Gagon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 325, 325 (Utah
1988) (stating that "an insurer's breach of its implied covenant to act in good faith toward
its insured did not, alone, give rise to a cause of action in tort; rather, the cause of action
was one in contract"); Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah

5

The Court recognized that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may
also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract, and may give rise to
causes of action in tort. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. For example, the Court stated,
"intentional and outrageous conduct by an insurer against its insured, coupled with a
failure to bargain, could conceivably result in tort liability independent of (and concurrent
with) liability for breach of contract." Id. The Appellants have not alleged, nor can they,
that State Farm owed them any duties that exist independently of the Policy. Nor have
Appellants alleged intentional and outrageous conduct, coupled with a failure to bargain,
that would warrant concurrent contract and tort liability.
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Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty
running from the insurer to its insured).
Thus, Appellants' claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and breach of fiduciary duty must be construed as contract claims, rather than tort
claims. Appellants' claims for misrepresentation and fraud also must be construed as
contract claims. Each of these claims is based upon the parties' insurance contract, and
none of the duties and/or obligations allegedly owed to Appellants by State Farm exists
independently of the insurance contract. Moreover, the no fault statute provides that
"[t]he person entitled to [PIP] benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the
expenses plus the applicable interest." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). The no fault
statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue his insurer in tort. Because
each of Appellants' claims against State Farm arises out of the parties' insurance
contract, Appellants' claims against State Farm are barred by the applicable three-year
statute of limitations.
IV.

STATE FARM'S RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION WAS AN APPROPRIATE
VEHICLE FOR DECIDING THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' claims
against State Farm because, according to Appellants, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure may not be used to challenge the underlying merits of a claim or to raise
affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations. Appellants have misconstrued the
scope of Rule 12(b)(6).

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359

24

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is based upon a party's failure to state a claim for
which relief may be granted. To prevail, the movant must show that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. See 2
Moore's Federal Practice (3d ed. 2000) § 12.34[l][a]. A cause of action may be
dismissed for failure to plead a necessary element, or for misstating or misapplying the
law. In addition, a party's failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted may
rest upon any number of affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations, statute of
frauds, or laches. See id. at § 12.34[4][b].
Appellants contend that State Farm's motion to dismiss improperly addressed the
merits of the Appellants' claim. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted
where, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulging
all reasonable inferences in his favor, the plaintiff cannot state a claim for which relief
may be granted. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219
(Utah 1996). Such is the case here. Appellants' claims against State Farm rest upon the
incorrect assumption that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct independent medical
examinations of its insureds to determine whether the claimed medical expenses are
reasonable and necessary. Under Utah law and the no fault statute, an insurer may
conduct independent medical examinations and, indeed, may limit payment of PIP
benefits to its insureds on the basis of those examinations. Appellants have failed to
provide any authority to show otherwise.

GOLDSMA\SLC\l 75359

25

Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in granting State Farm's
motion to dismiss based upon State Farm's assertion that the statute of limitations had
run. Utah courts routinely grant motions to dismiss based upon affirmative defenses,
such as statutes of limitation. See Williams v. Howard et aL 970 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah
1998) (reversing trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based upon statute
of limitations); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995) (affirming Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff s libel claim against defendant on the ground that
plaintiffs claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations); Nilson-Newey & Co.
v. Utah Resources Int'l 905 P.2d 312, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's
grant of defendant's motion to dismiss based on laches); Hansen v. Department of Fin.
Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming order of district court granting
defendant's motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations). See also 2 Moore's
Federal Practice (3d ed. 2000) § 12.34[4][b] (stating that "[dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
may also be appropriate when a successful affirmative defense or other bar to relief
appears on the face of the complaint, such as the absolute immunity of a defendant, claim
preclusion, or the statute of limitations"). Appellants have provided no support for the
proposition that a party is precluded from raising an affirmative defense in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. The trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claims against State Farm
based upon the statute of limitations was appropriate.
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V.

STATE FARM'S USE OF MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS TO LIMIT
OR DENY PIP BENEFITS DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH'S OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE

Without any authority, Appellants argue that if State Farm is permitted to restrict
PIP benefits to its insured on the basis of the findings of a medical examiner chosen and
paid for by State Farm, the no fault statute will be rendered unconstitutional under the
open courts provision in Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Appellants have
misconstrued the scope and effect of the open courts clause, which provides that
[a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11; Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1997). The Utah
Supreme Court has held that a statute eliminating a previously existing common law
remedy must provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy to comport with the requirements of the open courts clause. See Craftsman
Builder's Supply. Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Utah 1999) (holding the
builders statute of repose constitutional under open courts clause). If the statute does not
provide an alternative remedy, "abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated artd the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the objective." Id.
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The fatal flaw in Appellants' argument lies in their failure to point to a common
law remedy that has been abrogated by the Utah no fault statute. To the contrary, all of
Appellants' claims against State Farm are based on contract and on the no fault statute.
The courts never have held that the open courts clause prevents the legislature from
imposing conditions on statutory rights to relief.
The open courts clause ensures that a party's right to relief under the common law
is not abrogated by statute. The no fault statute does not abrogate Appellants' access to
court, nor does it prevent Appellants from obtaining common law relief from anyone.
The no fault statute expressly provides that a person entitled to benefits may bring an
action against the tortfeasor who caused the injury, see Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l),
and "may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses" to which he claims he is
entitled. Id. at § 31A-22-309(5)(d). This is precisely what Appellants have done. Thus,
State Farm legitimately may limit or deny PIP benefits on the basis of the findings of a
medical examination by a physician retained by State Farm without running afoul of the
open courts clause. Appellants have the right to contest any findings of their insurer, and
to seek the appropriate relief in court. The open courts clause is not pertinent to this case.

6

Appellants' open courts clause argument also evidences a misunderstanding of the no
fault statute. Appellants suggest that State Farm attempts to improperly inject an
exclusionary provision into the no fault statute in an effort to avoid liability under the
Appellants' policy. This argument is without support. Utah's no fault statute provides
that insurers are liable only for the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical
services. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l). The "reasonable and necessary" test is
not an attempt by State Farm to exclude coverage, as Appellants contend. It is, rather, a
legislatively-mandated predicate to application of the statute.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants have failed to establish that it is unlawful for an insurer to rely upon
the findings of a medical examination to limit or deny PIP benefits to an insured.
Appellants also have failed to provide any just reason why the three-year statute of
limitations governing insurance contract actions does not bar their claims against State
Farm. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of
Appellants' claims against State Farm.
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Utah Code Ann. §

31A-22-307

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies.
All rights reserved.
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2001 SUPPLEMENT * * *
* * * (2001 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION) * * *
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART 3. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR T H I S J U R I S D I C T I O N
Utah Code Ann. § 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 7

(2001)

§ 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 7 . Personal injury protection coverages and benefits
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental,
rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 8 5 % of any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days,
for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this benefit
need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's inability
to perform these services continues for more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of
$3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in Subsection
(1) and under Subsection 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 9 ( l ) ( a ) ( v ) , the commissioner shall conduct a relative
value study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit
value and determine the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation.
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the department may
consult or contract with appropriate public and private medical and health agencies or other
technical experts. The costs and expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and
administering the relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section 59-9105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value
study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to each type of
service and accommodation.
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the

unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or accommodation under
the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the
75th percentile charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or
accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or
accommodation in the most populous county of this state.
(c) This Subsection (2) does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule already
established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the
requirements of this Subsection (2).
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of
overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within 30
days after such insurer has knowledge of such pattern.
(e) (i) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party may
designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to examine
the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical
services or expenses.
(ii) An impartial medical panel designated under Subsection (2)(e)(i) shall consist of a
majority of health care professionals within the same license classification and specialty as
the provider of the claimant's medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection ( l ) ( a ) and in Subsection 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 9 ( l )
(a)(v) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse only the
loss of gross income benefits of Subsection ( l ) ( b ) ( i ) if the insured states in writing that:
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse
received any earned income from regular employment; and
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of insurance,
neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from regular
employment.
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages
greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it require the
segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy.
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required under this
section.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 7 , enacted by L 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159;
1989, ch. 2 6 1 , § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1 9 9 1 , ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 7 1 , § 1 ; 2 0 0 1 , ch. 59,
§ 2; 2 0 0 1 , ch. 116, § 67.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 2001 amendment by ch. 59, effective April 30, 2 0 0 1 , corrected
subsection references in Subsections (2)(a) and (3) and made a stylistic change.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 116, effective April 30, 2 0 0 1 , added Subsection (2)(e)(ii) and
made stylistic changes.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
Allowable benefits.
— Household services.
— Loss of earnings.
Arbitration panel.
Dismissal of claim.
Time computation.
Tort claims.
— Availability of insurance benefits.
— Motorist's liability.
ALLOWABLE BENEFITS.
— HOUSEHOLD SERVICES.
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred" in
former version of this section was included to eliminate the necessity of proving such
expenses and to prevent the insurer from claiming the benefit of services rendered
gratuitously by friends or relatives which otherwise would have to be paid for; it did not
require that reimbursement be made any time a family lost the services of one of its
members regardless of the character of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
Former provisions did not require insurer to pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured
in an automobile accident $12 per day during the period of the boy's disablement as
reimbursement for the value of lost services, which would have consisted of doing dishes,
carrying out the garbage, washing the family car, and other similar chores because it was not
reasonable to assume that the family would in fact have incurred expenses to perform the
boy's chores, and so they were not entitled to reimbursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire
Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he
"disabled" for purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
The legislature intended to establish the mandatory household services benefit as an
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability,
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on each day services are actually rendered. Tanner
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
— LOSS OF EARNINGS.
"Disability" refers to the inability to work; injured party who was able to work during the
period for which disability benefits were sought and who earned more than $150 per week
during the entire time for which benefits were sought was not entitled to disability benefits
for loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
A claimant who was unemployed at the time of his or her accident can collect disability
benefits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a
job was available for which the claimant was qualified and that the claimant would have
taken that j o b . The legislature did not intend to provide compensation for "loss of earning
capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and specific monetary loss. Versluis v.
Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992).
ARBITRATION PANEL.
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
DISMISSAL OF CLAIM.
This statute provides no basis on which to dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
TIME COMPUTATION.

The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection ( l ) ( b ) ( i ) runs from the loss of gross income
and loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to
suffer loss of income and loss of earning capacity until six months after an accident and
continued to suffer that loss for a period exceeding the maximum benefit of 52 weeks was
improperly denied coverage when the trial court only provided for coverage for 52 weeks
following the date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
TORT CLAIMS.
- AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE BENEFITS.
No-fault benefits are available to those who sustain serious injury even though they remain
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the injured person is not entitled to a double
recovery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), see also Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978
P.2d 460.
Where insured brought action against his no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault
benefits after receiving benefits from the no-fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against a
third-party tort-feasor, insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional no-fault
benefits in the form of lost wages but was not collaterally estopped from recovering for
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
- MOTORISTS LIABILITY.
A party having the security required under this section is granted partial tort immunity and
is not personally liable for the benefits provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary
tort claims, such as general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits
paid hereunder, if the threshold provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie,
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 6 0 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 113.
A.L.R. —Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229.
Validity of state statute prohibiting health providers from the practice of waiving patients'
obligation to pay health insurance deductibles or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8
A.L.R.5th 855.
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TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 2 1 . INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR T H I S J U R I S D I C T I O N
Utah Code Ann. § 3 1 A - 2 1 - 3 1 3

(2001)

§ 3 1 A - 2 1 - 3 1 3 . Limitation of actions
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be commenced
within three years after the inception of the loss.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to
limitation of actions in Title 78, Chapter 12, Limitation of Actions, applies to actions on
insurance policies.
(3) An insurance policy may not:
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less than that authorized
by statute;
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration provisions in
contracts.
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will arise from
a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no
action may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel payment under
the policy until the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy;
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment.
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties conduct an
appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to
by the parties.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 3 1 A - 2 1 - 3 1 3 , enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 2 6 ; 1986, ch. 204, § 149;
1996, ch. 193, § 2.
NOTES:

Page 2 of 3
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection (1)
added "first party"; in Subsection (2) added "Limitation of Actions"; and made two stylistic
changes.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Operation of section.
Timeliness.
When loss occurs.
Cited.
OPERATION OF SECTION.
Action for breach of the insurer's duty to defend was controlled by the three-year period of
this section, which, although not yet enacted when the policy was issued, was in effect at the
time the cause of action accrued. Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T , Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661 (D.
Utah 1990), a f f d , 953 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1992).
A long-term disability plan is subject to the 3-year limitation period applicable to claims for
denial of insurance benefits, not the 6-year period applicable to claims for breach of contract.
Moore v. Berg Enters., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Utah 1998).
The statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs claim under the federal retirement
income security statute was § 3 1 A - 2 1 - 3 1 3 ( 1 ) since, although the claim was based upon a
contract, it was more precisely based upon a contract of insurance. Lang v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 196 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1999).
TIMELINESS.
The cross-claim, to the extent that it sought contribution for sums the insurance company
paid in defending the plaintiff, related back to the date of the filing of the original complaint
and was therefore timely filed. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127
(Utah 1997).
WHEN LOSS OCCURS.
The "inception of the loss" language in Subsection (1) means that the limitations period
should begin to run when the first loss is incurred. In a suit for an alleged breach of an
insurer's duty to defend, the insured's first loss occurs when the insured first incurs defense
expenses. Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T , Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661 (D. Utah 1990), a f f d , 953
*F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1992).
CITED in Imperial Sav. Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Utah 1990); Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. - 4 4 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1876 et seq.
C.J.S. - 4 6 A C.J.S. Insurance § 1544 et seq.
A.L.R. —Application to period of limitation fixed by contract, of statute permitting new action
to be brought within specified time after failure of prior action for cause other than on the
merits, 16 A.L.R.3d 452.
Time when period provided for in suicide clause of life or accident policy begins to run, 37
A.L.R.3d 933.
Insurer's failure to pay amount of admitted liability as precluding reliance on statute of
limitations, 4 1 A.L.R.3d 1111.
Fraud, misrepresentation, or deception as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 43
A.L.R.3d 429.
Limitation of action against insurer for breach of contract to defend, 96 A.L.R.3d 1193.

When statute of limitations commences to run on automobile no-fault insurance personal
injury claim, 36 A.L.R.4th 357.
Value of insured's assets as limitation, in action by insured or insured's assignee for liability
insurer's wrongful failure to defend, on recovery of amount of judgment against insured in
excess of policy amount, 36 A.L.R.4th 922.
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as
applicable to tort action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859.
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Sec, 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
- Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
Discriminatory classification.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Health care professional immunity.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
- Choses in action.
- Habeas corpus.
- Limitation of actions.
- Statutory limitation of review.
No-fault statute.
Occupational disease law.
Prisoners.
- Assessment of civil fees and costs.
- Malpractice actions.
Remedies.
Removal to federal court.
Requirement of deposit.
Sovereign immunity.
Statutes of repose.
Torts.
- Action by wife against husband.
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- Criminal conversation.
- Loss of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workers1 compensation law.
Cited.
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq., is vestec
originally in the federal courts, but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by state courts is not thereb;
prohibited; in view of the provisions of this section, therefore, it was error for trial court to dismiss for lad
of jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utal
1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the ground of forun
non conveniens in a proper case, but such dismissal should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff migh
move his suit to another forum without harm to his claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977).
Actions by court.
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond c
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 5<
Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LR. 1119 (1919).
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the state, whicl
alone can exercise sovereign powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state from reserving to itself th<
sole right to bring actions for the dissolution of building and loan associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. \
District Court, 44 Utah 397,140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821 (1914).
Actions not created.
This section does not create new rights, or give new remedies where none otherwise are given, bi
places a limitation upon Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing the door
of the courts against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with som
known remedy. Therefore, where no right of action is given or no remedy exists, under either the commo
law or some statute, this section creates none. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 1916A L.R./
1140(1915).
Arbitration.
The amendment of the arbitration statute to permit valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration <
future disputes does not violate this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Uta
1981).
An insurer and its adjuster could not bind the insured to arbitrate any claim against the insured for an
amount in excess of the policy limits; to do so would violate the insured's right of access to the courl
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998).
Assignments.
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff who was assignee of claim could bring action thereon even
claim was assigned for purpose of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Uts
217, 39 P.2d 308 (1934).
Attorneys1 duties.
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This section means that courts are open for the purpose of having any order or judgment assailed in
the proper manner and at the proper time, so that attorney with reasonable cause may act in good faith
and challenge an order he believes to be in excess of the court's jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315,
190 P. 952 (1920).
Criminal law.
- Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Former section providing that no judge, tribunal, or officer other than those mentioned therein could
suspend execution of judgment of death except sheriff as provided in succeeding sections with reference
to inquiry as to insanity of defendant did not violate this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87
Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935).
Debt collection.
To collect past-due claim in court is right guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Merchants'
Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925).
Discriminatory classification.
A statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a
remedy for personal injury under this section is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than
a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a
valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Lee ex
rel. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993).
District court jurisdiction.
The district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil
and criminal, not excepted and prohibited by the Constitution. Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P.
188(1921).
District courts are courts of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law or
the Constitution, but one district court cannot exercise power or control over another. Nielson v. Schiller,
92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937).
Election contest.
There is no intimation herein that courts are given power to pass on purely political questions, but it is
clearly stated that courts are always open for the enforcement of such rights and redress of such wrongs
as from time immemorial have been considered as proper for courts to consider. The power to consider
political questions and the vindication of rights growing out of or incidental to such questions is not an
inherent power of the courts. Courts can exercise powers respecting political matters only to the extent
and in the manner provided by legislature, and election contest is not within jurisdiction of court of equity in
absence of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926).
Forum non conveniens.
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions arising under Federal
Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).
While courts have inherent power to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced that to do so
would work hardship on some or all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked
only where it appears that plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum for the purpose of annoying and
harassing defendant, or where factors such as the location of the principal parties, ease of access to
proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so strongly preponderate in favor of holding the trial somewhere else
that to deny a motion to dismiss would work great hardship on defendant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus.
Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977).
Health care professional immunity.
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Section 58-13-2, which affords immunity to a physician rendering emergency medical care at the
scene of an emergency occurring in a hospital if the physician is under no preexisting duty to do so, does
not violate this section. Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997).
Injury or damage to property.
A right of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and neither the legislature nor
municipalities can interfere with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Natl Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C
LR.A. 1260(1915).
Intoxicating liquor.
The liquor nuisance sections of the former Liquor Control Act did not contravene this section. Riggins
v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).
Depriving a holder of a state liquor store lease of his liquor store without notice, hearing, or any judicial .
review offends against both the guarantee of due process and the guarantee of access to the courts.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
Land Registration Act.
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on registrar of titles.
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920).
. Limitations.
Former Section 78-15-3, a limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions
without regard to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which
to file a lawsuit, was unconstitutional because it violated this section and the constitutional prohibition
against abrogation of wrongful death actions. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1986).
The former architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under this
section because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy was arbitrary and
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989).
The former Utah architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under
this section because it denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property caused by a latent defect.
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a four-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief not
otherwise provided by law,M does not violate this section. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835
(D. Utah 1989), affd, 927 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 894, 112 S. Ct. 263, 116 L Ed. 2d
217(1991).
- Choses in action.
Because the acquisition of a legal malpractice claim by the law firm against which it was filed would
have the effect of denying the claimant his right to a trial on his claim, and where there would be no
prejudice suffered by the firm, since any judgment recovered would be offset against the legitimate
amounts owed the firm, the public's interest in a legal system and legal profession that is just in both
appearance and fact supported the setting aside of the acquisition of the chose by the firm. Snow, Nuffer,
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, 980 P.2d 208.
- Habeas corpus.
The three-month limitation period in § 78-12-31.1 is an unreasonable limitation on the constitutional
right to petition for a habeas corpus writ that violates rights under this section to seek a civil remedy in
state courts. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah
1994).
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- Limitation of actions.
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within
which to assail the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P.
555(1915).
The statute of limitations in § 35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a denial of justice to overcome its
presumption of constitutionality; when a petitioner knew of his injury within the limitations period, the
section did not violate this section. Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
- Statutory limitation of review.
Former act authorizing improvement districts for water or sewage systems did not violate this section
on the ground that it limited or prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950).
This section does not prevent the abolition of obsolete causes of action. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818
P.2d8(Utah1991).
No-fault statute.
The no-fault statute, § 31A-22-309, satisfies this provision because it not only provides a tort victim
with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or economic evil. Warren v.
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Occupational disease law.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and
in rendering remedy under that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-law right of action therefor, was
not unconstitutional as depriving employee of his remedy by due course of law for injury done to his
person. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L. Ed. 411 (1948).
Prisoners.
- Assessment of civil fees and costs.
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to determine the amount of a prisoner's funds available for
payment of filing fees and costs, does not unreasonably limit a prisoner's right to bring a petition for
extraordinary relief. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
- Malpractice actions.
Sections 63-30-4 and 63-30-10, precluding prisoners from bringing negligence actions against the
state or prison physicians, are constitutional: while prisoners' status as felons does not justify divesting
them of all of their rights, it does play a role in determining whether the statutory classification of prisoners
apart from other members of society is constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996).
Remedies.
Where, for a period of a year and a day, the plaintiff had been barred by legislative enactments from
all actions of the type asserted by her against a government agency and its employees, where the
legislature had provided no alternative remedy, and where there was no clear state social or economic evil
to be obviated by the abrogation of remedies, the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and reversal
of summary judgment was required. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d
1171.
Removal to federal court.
Rights of litigants under this section must yield to the right of diverse defendants under federal
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removal statutes. Copier ex rel. Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998).
Requirement of deposit.
To the extent that § 59-1-505, requiring a taxpayer to deposit the amount in dispute in order to obtain
judicial review of a tax commission decision, precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the
open courts provision of this section and is unconstitutional as applied to an indigent taxpayer. However,
the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional in all cases; for example, when a taxpayer is able to meet
the requirement, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992).
Sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah
1983); DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
This section is implicated only if a statute denies a person the right to sue the state when the state
performs a nongovernmental function. The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the
test developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (1980), and has immunity under §
63-30-10(2), immunizing government entities from suit from injuries arising out of an assault or battery;
thus, the immunity act was not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured when assaulted
and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are outside the protection of
this section; thus, in an action against a county building official and the county for injuries based on
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building permit, the defendants' acts were
core governmental functions within the scope of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3)
and (4) of § 63-30-10. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
Statutes of repose.
Given the clear social and economic evils identified by the legislature in enacting the builders' statute
of repose, § 78-12-25.5, and the remote chance of injury or damage after a period of years, the statute is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under this
section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194.
Torts.
- Action by wife against husband.
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar wife's action against husband for the intentional
infliction of personal injuries. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).
- Criminal conversation.
Abolition of the tort of criminal conversation does not violate the open courts provision. Norton v.
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991).
- Loss of consortium.
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) was a reasonable legislative enactment intended and
reasonably tailored to place men and women on equal footing with respect to their ability to bring actions
for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife was the property of her husband. If, in the
process, the husband's right to sue for loss of his wife's consortium, which may have never existed in
Utah, was abolished, that abolition was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah
1988).
Unlicensed law practice.
This section does not render unconstitutional statute making practice of law without a license a crime.
Legislature has the power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to be illegal, and to punish
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violations thereof by fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear in person and prosecute or defend a
cause to which one is a party cannot be abrogated either by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. Smith,
107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634, 157 A.LR. 512 (1944).
Waiver of rights.
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is substantial right, and will not be waived by contract
except through unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486,251 P. 16 (1926).
Workers' compensation law.
Employers are entitled to have recourse to courts under Workmen's Compensation Act concerning
question of their ultimate liability. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918).
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial commission the power
to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property
rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 (1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of third party, a stranger to employment, are not limited to
recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 (1927).
The eight-year time limitation on temporary total disability benefits in the Worker's Compensation Law
is not an unconstitutional statute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Middlestadt v. Indus.
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah
1993); Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171.
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State Rules
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART I I I . PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
URCP Rule 12 (2001)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a crossclaim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall
serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the
order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer
than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining
claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall
be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on
a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time

as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned
in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any
party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty
days after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it
the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under
this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this
rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on
any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading,
if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits,
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of
any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of
this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff
to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon
hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security
shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant,
enter an order dismissing the action.

HISTORY: Amended effective Sept. 4 , 1985; April 1 , 1990; November 1 , 2000.
NOTES:
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment in Subdivision (a) added the language beginning
"within the state and within thirty days" at the end of the first sentence and "but a motion
directed" at the end of the last sentence, and made stylistic changes throughout.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P.
Cross References. — Motions generally, U.R.C.P. 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
— Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
— Bill of particulars.
— Criteria.
— Motion to dismiss distinguished.
— Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
— Explained.
— Habeas corpus.
— Improper.
— Standard.
— Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
— Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
— How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce.
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted.
General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
Venue.
— When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
— Failure to file.
Standard of review.
Summary judgment.
— Conversion of motion to dismiss.
— Court's discretion.
~ Court's initiative.
-- Defenses.
— Opportunity to present pertinent material.
— Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.

— Defect of parties.
— Defective service of process.
— Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
— Failure to join indispensable party.
— Failure to pay consideration.
— Mutual mistake.
— Statute of frauds.
— Statute of limitations.
— Waiver.
Cited.
Jurisdiction over the person.
When urging the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction based only on documentary
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in order to proceed to trial on the merits.
Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502
U.S. 900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
— Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of the pleadings for purposes of j u d g m e n t on the
pleadings and if the court considers them the other party must have the privilege of offering
answering affidavits as upon a motion for summary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v.
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953).
Rights of opposing party.
On review of a motion on the pleadings treated as a motion for summary judgment under
Subdivision (c), the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light
most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958).
Motion for more definite statement.
— Bill of particulars.
A motion for a more definite statement, and not discovery procedures, is the appropriate
means of obtaining the information formerly sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953).
— Criteria.
A motion for a more definite statement is properly made only when the complaint is
indefinite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual allegations or legal theory to such an extent
that the moving party cannot reasonably be required to frame his responsive pleading. Liquor
Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952).
— Motion to dismiss distinguished.
Where the complaint states a claim in general language but is not sufficiently definite in
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certain respects to enable defendant to answer, the proper remedy is a motion for a more
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,
243 P.2d 4 4 1 (1952).
— Purpose.
Delay.
A motion for a more definite statement should be summarily dealt with if made for the
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 4 4 1 (1952).
Obtaining evidence.
Motions for a more definite statement are not properly used to obtain evidence from the
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 4 4 1 (1952).
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
— Explained.
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts alleged in the complaint but
challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah
1995).
— Habeas corpus.
Although Rule 65B generally governs the drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas corpus
petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule applies to habeas corpus petitions in which petitioner
fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987
(Utah 1997).
— Improper.
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the record did not persuade the
appeals court that there was no set of facts under which the defendant might succeed. Olson
v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrichment if
no reimbursement for payment made on loan guarantee).
In a wrongful death action based on attractive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap" in
complaint could reasonably be construed to refer to a hidden trap and complaint was
sufficiently descriptive. Whipple ex rel. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d
1218 (Utah 1996).
Complaint for wrongful death, alleging that the injuries and death occurred because of a
defective irrigation ditch and its associated channelling devices, bridges, currents, and
trappings and that as a further direct and proximate result of the defective and unreasonably
dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch, plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial
support, comfort, society, advice, care, companionship, affection and happiness of association
of the decedent, contained allegations of causation sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs case because her allegation of facts
concerning each element of the claim of breach of contract was sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
— Standard.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in
his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995).
— Standard of review.
When reviewing a judgment entered on a motion to dismiss under Subdivision ( b ) ( 6 ) , the
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Heiner v. S J . Groves & Sons
Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995).
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule, an appellate court must accept the material
allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University
of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University
of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate
court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v.
State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1996).
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
— Forum-selection clause in contract.
The parties' prior agreement in the contract that is the subject of the dispute as to the place
of the action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail
Sys., 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993).
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of
proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the chosen state would be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to
require the plaintiff to bring suit there would be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993).
Presentation of defenses.
— How presented.

Affirmative defenses.
Since an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case,
any matter that does not tend to controvert the opposing party's prima facie case should be
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. T i m m , 720 P.2d 1352
(Utah 1986).
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act (§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or an
"avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleging negligence, and, to preserve the act as a
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.,
793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
Divorce.
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's motion to dismiss and for a more definite
statement in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).
Election of remedies.
The defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one that must be raised by way of
answer, motion, or demand and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Royal
Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979).
Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted.
A complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the
claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 4 4 1 ( 1 9 5 2 ) ; Christensen v.
Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970).
A complaint is required to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved, or it is subject
to dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475
P.2d 1019 (1970).
Action against city for breach of implied contract was properly dismissed for failure to state
claim upon which relief could be granted, since the contract to review bids on an equal basis
was too nebulous to be enforceable, and the city is immune to tort action for deceit. Rapp v.
Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).
In an unlawful detainer action in which the notice is defective, the defective notice results in
a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted rather than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979).
General and special appearances.
The distinction between general and special appearances has been abolished by Subdivision
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs, v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976).
Statute of frauds.
The defense of the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded
pursuant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision
(b) of this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970).
Venue.

A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for objecting to venue improperly laid; an
objection to venue should be made by a motion for change of place of trial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3
Utah 2d 410, 285 P.2d 843 (1955).
— When presented.
Amended answer.
Motion for leave to file an amended answer was properly denied where movant failed to file
anything in support of the motion and did not call the motion for hearing until the case was
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc., 24 Utah 2d 2 7 1 , 470 P.2d 257 (1970).
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
— Failure to file.
An objection raised that security for costs was not filed within one month after notice is at
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of technical objections which do not go to the
merits and are not prejudicial to the interests of the parties. Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett
D. Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 (1954).
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating suit, and 11 days after
cost bond under Subdivision ( j ) , and, though almost three months
filed as soon as an administrator was appointed, trial court should
failure to file bond within 30 days. Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d
denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 5 1 , 4 L Ed. 2d 60 (1959).

demand of a nonresident
later, a surety bond was
not dismiss action for
333, 334 P.2d 562, cert,

Standard of review.
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is a question of law, reviewable for correctness.
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 P.2d 602.
Summary judgment.
— Conversion of motion to dismiss.
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment
only when it appears as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot recover; and where there
was a question of actual knowledge of defendant as to the claim against the property, motion
to dismiss and summary judgment were improper. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah
1975).
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality and legality of
annexation conditions properly treated as motion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975).
I t is generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977).
Where defendant's motion was initially for dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, once matters outside the pleadings were presented
to and not excluded by the trial court, the motion was properly treated as one for summary
j u d g m e n t Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994).

If a trial court cannot on its own motion convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, then certainly the Supreme Court should not allow the
moving party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
When affidavits or other evidence is presented to support a motion to dismiss under
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court does not exclude t h e m , the motion is generally
treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996).
This rule does not convert motions based on subdivisions (b)(1) through (5) into motions for
summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36.
— Court's discretion.
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider matters
outside the pleadings initially lies in the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Associated
Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
— Court's initiative.
A court should not, on its own initiative, try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for
summary judgment by requesting additional evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc.,
25 Utah 2d 1 2 1 , 477 P.2d 150 (1970).
— Defenses.
Defenses which have not been raised by the answer or by proper motion may not be raised in
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983).
— Opportunity to present pertinent material.
Once the trial court makes a determination to consider materials outside the pleading upon a
motion to dismiss, the mandatory provision of Subdivision (b) controls and all parties must
be given adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting materials, particularly the
party against whom the motion has been made. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
It is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that, when a motion to
dismiss is made and matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, all parties are given reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if
they wish. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978).
— Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
I t only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on other side of controversy and
create issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191
(Utah 1975).
Waiver of defenses.
— Defect of parties.

Any objection to a defect of parties is waived, if not asserted by a party as provided in
Subdivision (h). Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976).
— Defective service of process.
The affirmative defense of defective service of process was waived by defendant, who failed
to raise the defense in its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and did not raise the issue
during a summary judgment hearing, but raised it for the first time on appeal. Watkiss &
Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs' failure to comply with the indorsement provision
of § 78-36-8, which requires court indorsement of the summons, barred their action under
Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute. Defendant, by answering plaintiffs' complaint
without raising the defense of insufficiency of process and by proceeding through trial and the
verdict before raising that defense, waived it under Subdivision (h) of this rule. Fowler v.
Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
-- Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived by
the parties. This prohibition against waiver applies only to subject matter jurisdiction and is
consistent with federal law. Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993).
When issues raised.
Issues brought under the exceptions of Subdivision (h) may be raised before or during trial.
Subdivision (h) does not mean that failure to state a claim can be raised for the first time on
appeal. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985).
— Failure to join indispensable party.
When a party asserts the defense of failure to join an indispensable party for the first time at
the trial on the merits, it should be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b). Papanikolas Bros.
Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975).
— Failure to pay consideration.
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable instrument is an affirmative defense which is
required, under Rule 8(c), to be pleaded; and unless it is pleaded, pursuant to Subdivision
(h) of this rule, it ordinarily will be considered waived as a defense, unless there is a motion
to amend, or the parties acquiesce in the trial of that issue, or the plaintiff is otherwise given
notice and an opportunity to meet the issue. Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1974).
— Mutual mistake.
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima facie
case, and the failure to assert it is a waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr.
Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
— Statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the pleadings, else
it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983).

— Statute of limitations.
In an action by water user challenging charges of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim.
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962).
The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive
pleading, or it is waived, unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983).
— Waiver.
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract to purchase a business from defendant on ground
that the agreement was procured by fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud had been
waived by plaintiffs continued operation of the business, the allegation of waiver was an
affirmative defense which should have been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a waiver
of the defense under this rule. Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah
1976).
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah 377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of North
Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57,
305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d 924
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172
(Utah 1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694
P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank
& Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989); Weber v.
Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. Valley Mtg. Co., 835
P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v.
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361
(Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et seq., 8 6 ; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, 280, 389 et seq.
CJ.S. - 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, 138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 CJ.S.
Dismissal and Nonsuit § 6 7 ; 71 CJ.S. Pleading §§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to
268, 424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586.
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as affected by opponent's motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
What, other than affidavits, constitutes "matters outside the pleadings," which may convert
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2
A.L.R. Fed. 1027.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Necessity of oral argument on motion for summary judgment on pleadings in federal court,

105 A.LR. Fed. 755.
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15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
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Biputy Clark

Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN TUCKER,

individually and on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 980907369

vs.

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P. MARBLE,
M.D., M A YE HELEN POTTER, and FARMERS
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, .

j

Defendants.

On January 22, 2001, Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's
("State Farm") Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment also came before the Court. Plaintiffs were
represented by Trent J. Waddoups. Defendant State Farm was represented by Alan L. Sullivan
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and Adrianne Goldsmith. The Court has considered the terms of the insurance policy under
which the plaintiffs were insured at the time of the accident. The Court also has considered the
admissions of plaintiffs' counsel at argument. Because these matters have been presented to and
considered by the Court, the Court has exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the close of the hearing, the Court granted judgment in favor of State Farm on the
basis of State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion
to Dismiss, and denied plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The following facts are alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint, appear in the plaintiffs*
insurance policy, or were admitted by plaintiffs:
1. On August 5, 1994, plaintiffs Dee Voy and Marian Tucker were involved in an
automobile accident with Maye Helen Potter.
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were insured under a State Farm automobile
insurance policy.
3. Plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy provided that State Farm would reimburse
plaintiffs for the reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs up to
$3,000.00 per person in connection with a covered accident.
4. Plaintiffs alleged significant back and neck injuries resulting from this accident, for
which they each sought medical treatment.
5. Plaintiffs' medical providers performed various tests and treatments in the spring of
1996 to alleviate plaintiffs' alleged injuries, thereby causing plaintiffs to incur medical expenses.
6. Plaintiffs submitted their medical bills to State Farm for reimbursement.
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7. Plaintiffs' insurance policy provided that an insured who made a claim against the
policy would be required to undergo a medical examination by a physician chosen and retained
by State Farm as often as State Farm reasonably required.
8. Per plaintiffs' policy, State Farm required plaintiffs to undergo a medical examination
by Dr. Stephen Marble to determine whether the claimed medical expenses were reasonable and
necessary.
9. On October 22, 1996, after examining the patients and reviewing their medical
records, Dr. Marble concluded that Dee Voy Tucker's injuries arose from and were related to the
automobile accident. With respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one
set of x-rays was duplicative and therefore unnecessary.
10. Dr. Marble concluded that Marian Tucker's injuries did not arise from the accident,
and, instead, were related to a pre-existing condition.
11. In November 1996, based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm declined to
reimburse plaintiffs for all of their claimed medical expenses. State Farm reimbursed plaintiffs
only for those expenses deemed reasonable and necessary.
12. Plaintiffs filed suit against Ms. Potter on July 23, 1998 for negligence.
13. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on September 12, 2000 to include State Farm as a
defendant.
14. Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that State Farm did not meet its
obligation under Utah's personal injury protection statute (the "no fault" statute), see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 31A-22-307 to -309 (2000), to reimburse plaintiffs for their claimed medical expenses.
15. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that State Farm's retention of Dr.
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Marble to conduct a medical examination, and State Farm's denial of coverage based upon the
results of that examination, were unlawful Plaintiffs have asserted claims for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and
fraud.
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed
to state claims for which relief may be granted, and that State Farm is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The Court's ruling is based on two independent grounds. First, plaintiffs have
failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct medical examinations to
determine whether claimed medical expenses are reasonable and necessary. Second, plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance contract actions. Specifically,
the Court concludes as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit or deny

coverage of an insured based upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained
by State Farm.
(a)

Each of plaintiffs' claims rests upon the incorrect assumption that it is

unlawful under both Utah law and the plaintiffs' insurance policy for State Farm
to retain a physician to conduct a medical examination of an insured, and to limit
or deny coverage to an insured on the basis of that examination.
(b)

Utah's no-fault statute provides personal injury protection ("PEP") benefits

to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical.. . services,
not to exceed a total of$3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a).
Plaintiffs' insurance policy contains language to the same effect. Thus, under
36541.0002\GOLDSMA\SLCU 54422
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Utah law and the parties' agreement, State Farm is obligated to reimburse
plaintiffs only for those medical expenses that are reasonable, necessary, and
related to a covered automobile accident.
(c)

It is neither improper nor unlawful for an insurer to conduct medical

examinations and to limit or deny coverage to its insureds on the basis of those
examinations. The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly condoned the use of such
medical examinations to determine whether claimed medical expenses are
reasonable and necessary. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co. et aL 973 P.2d 932
(Utah 1998). Such examinations allow insurers to determine whether an insured's
medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident.
2.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance

contract actions.
(a)

Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first

party insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (2000). The date of the inception of the loss is
when the first loss is incurred. See Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K & T, Inc., 745
F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law). In a case involving the
alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, the first loss is incurred no later than the date
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits.
(b)

Plaintiffs first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm first

declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. Plaintiffs did not file suit against State
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Farm until September 12, 2000, more than three years after the inception of the
loss.
(c)

Each of plaintiffs' claims rests in contract, not in tort. See Beck v.

Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (holding that in a first
party insurance relationship, the duties and obligations of the parties are
contractual, rather than fiduciary). All of plaintiffs' claims are based upon the
insurance policy. None of the duties or obligations allegedly owed to plaintiffs by
State Farm exists independently of the insurance policy. In addition, the "no
fault" statute provides that a person entitled to PIP benefits may bring an action in
contract to recover medical expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d).
The "no fault" statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue the
insurer in tort.
3.

As to each of plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED:
1.

Defendant State Farm's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and

Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby granted;
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied;

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied; and

4.

The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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5.

Defendant State Farm is hereby awarded its costs of court incurred in connection

with this action.
6.

The Court hereby certifies this judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 30, 2000, this Court ordered that plaintiffs' claims
against defendant Maye Helen Potter be severed from plaintiffs' claims against State Farm,
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Stephen P. Marble, M.D. The Court also ordered a separate
trial to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. Certification of this judgment is
appropriate because there is no significant factual overlap between the claims asserted by
plaintiffs against Ms. Potter, and those asserted by plaintiffs against State Farm. Plaintiffs'
claims against Ms. Potter concern liability, whereas plaintiffs' claims against State Farm
concern coverage. Thus, the outcome of any appeal of this judgment would not have a res
judicata effect on plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. See, e.g., Bennion v. Pennzoil Co. et al.,
826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992) (setting forth requirements for proper certification under Rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted).

DATED this
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day of February, 2001.
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APPROVED A^IQFORM:

TrentjTwaddoups
-Counsel for Plaintiffs
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CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

{£?

day of February, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, first-

class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR DISMISSAL to
the following:
Adrianne Goldsmith, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.
Gateway Tower West, Suite 1200
15 West South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq.
Can* & Waddoups
8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold L. Petersen
Petersen & Hansen
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David A. Greenwood, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Kevin Simon
Epperson & Rencher
10W. 100 S. #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
RUTH H A R E and WESLEY
Plaintiffs

HARBL,

v.

)

2:98 CV6S

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant

Presently before the court is a motion filed by plaintiffs, husband and wife Ruth and
Wesley Hste ("lie Hares"), on May 13, 2000, seeking to certify this action as a class action and to
amend the compLaint to add an additional defendant In order to properly address the merits of
that double-barreled motion, a detailed discussion of the history of this case is necessary.
This action originated as separate actions tiled in state court in January 1998, one by Ruth
Hare, and one by Wesley Hare. Each alleged that he/she had been involved in an automobile
accident (the same accident) and that his/ber automobile insurer, defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (''State Farm"), had in bad faith rcfiised to pay medical benefits
due under the policy of insurance and had committedfiaudby employing a third-party benefits
review fixm solely for the propose ofproducing a false report which could be used as a
justification for denying the medical benefits.
On March 2,1998, State Farm removed the actions to this court On December 14,1998,
Magistrate Judge Theresa L, Springmann conducted a staws conference where she consolidated
the cases as one under the above cause number, ordered that all discovery be completed by June
15,1999, and that any dispositive motions be filed by July 19,1999.

On January 19, L999, State Farm filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment On
February 2, 1999. the Hares moved for an extension of dme to respond, arguing that they needed
substantial discovery in order to frame meir response. After a status conference held on
March 16,1999, concerning that motion and a motion to compel discovery, Magistrate Judge
Springmann panted the Hares' .request, giving them until August 20,1999, to respond to State
Farm's motion for partial summary judgment.
On August 11.1999, the Hares advised Magistrate Judge Springmarm that they needed to
retain an expert to review discovery produced by State Farm and could not respond to the motion
tor summary judgment until after reviewing that expat's report Magistrate Judge Springmann
gave plamtiflS •until October 11,1999, to retain and make fell disclosure of the expert's opinion
pursuant vo RULE 26 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [docket entry 40].
On October 12,1999, the Hares sought a thirty-day extension to produce their expert
report, and on October 28,1999, Magistrate Judge Springmarm gave them until
November 29,1999, to do so. That deadline passed without the report being produced, and on
December 20,1999, Magistrate Judge Springmann conducted another status conference where
several new deadlines were set [docket entry 46], First, Magistrate Judge Springmann gave the
Hares a new deadline of March 31,2000, for completing their discovery. Second, she mooted ax
the pending motion for partial summary judgment, with leave for it to be reinstated after the Han
<*ere able to eomplate the discovery necessary toformulatetheir response. Last, she gave the
Hares a final (emphasis in original) extension until January 31.2000, to make their expert
disclosures.
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Discovery disputes, ongoing and being resolved by Magistrate Judge Spriagmann on a
continuous baaia during the agents grrmrnflnzcd above, continued. On April 28,2000, Magistrate
Judge Springmann conducted a final Status conference where she gave the Hares until
June 12, 2000, to produce their expert reports, extended discovery at the Hares'
request—agam—until September 29,2000, set a new dispositive motion deadline for
November 1# 2000, and a trial date of April 9,2001. Magistrate Judge Springmann's minute cntiy
following the conference warned that there would be kTSO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF
TIME OR CONTINUANCES on discovery, [or] filing and briefing of motions,«•* [docket entry
61].
The Hares* next move, on May IS, 20OOy was the request under consideration in this order
to certify this case as a class action and to amend their complaint to add a new defendant, the
third-parry benefits review firm referenced la their original complaints. State Farm immediately
objected to this request, characterizing it as an attempt to ftrther postpone resolution of its motion
for partial summary judgment filed nearly a year and a half earlier and delay the trial date, and
asked the court either to deny class certification or to postpone its decision on that issue until after
deciding State Farm's; motion for partial summary judgment
On November la 2000, State Farm renewed its motion for partial summary judgment by
filing substantially die same motion as it had filed before. On December 1,2000. the
Hares—finally—responded to that motion. That motion became fully-briefed an January 4f 2001
[docket entty 82].
In their original complaints, (he Hares alleged that S^atc Farm had employed a third-party
benefits review firm to produce inaccurate and false reports to be used as a justification to deny
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the Hares' medical expenses. In their motion seeking to certify the u s e as a class action, the1
Hares allege that State Farm conspiredwith the firm involved, Medical Biomechanics, Inc.
CBMTO TO produce false end inaccurate reports to defraud State Farm's insureds of medical
benefits to which they were entitled The Hares allege thai through discovery they have reviewed
101 other cases where State Farm utilized BMIf and in 9S% of those 101 cases BM1 recommended
that medical benefits be denied.1 The Hares allege that the reports produced by BMI were
essentially boilerplate reports, produced at State Farm's direction using stock phrases and reasons
fox denial, rather than actual substantive reviews of the facts at issue in each individual case. The
Hares seek to have certified as a class those policyholders referenced in at least 606 reports
prepared by BMI for State Farm in Indiana,
The requirements far maintaining a class action are set out in Fed, R. Civ, P. 23* First,
plaintiff must establish that all four of the prerequisites of RULE 23(a) are met: (1) numerasity (the
class must be so large * that joinder of all members is impracticable''): (2) commonality (there
must exist "questions of law or fact caramon ta the class1'); (3) typicality (named panics* claims or
defenses must be 'typical... of the class'1); and (4) adequacy of representation (the representative
must be able to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class14)- KeeU v. Wader, 149
F.3d 589,594 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v* Windsor, 521 U.S, S91, 613-14,117
S-Ct 2231,2245, 138 L £ d 2 d 689 (1997)); see FED- R Qv. P. 23(a). Then, plaintiff must show

1

In their motion to certify the class the Hares assert that this conspiracy was pled in their
original complaints. The court accepts this as true, if the complaints are liberally read.
* It bears pointing our thai the Hares argue that this high denial rate is itself evidence of
fraud, k seems likdy, however, thai State Fann would only send ftr outside medfc^ review
those cases which fr^tt™! claims adjusters believed questionable. This could account far the
high denial ram. Thus, the denial rate itself has little or no evidentiary value.

that thff action fits within one of the categories described by RUIB 23(b), which need not be
summarized hern.
Ordinarily the decision whether or not to certify a ease as a class action should be made
prior to any ruling on the merits, jee Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Carp*t 107 F,3d 466,474
(7th Cir< 1997), and based on an assumption thai the allegations made in support of certification
are true -without consideration of the merits of the case. See Riordnn v. Smith Barney, 113 FJLD,
60, 62 (NJDJ1L19S6). This, however, is not an ordinary case. The presumption that certification
should be decided before any ruling on the merits is made springs from the language of
FED JLCivJ . 23, which directs:
As soon as practicable after the comtneucement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be so maintained,
ITED,R.Clv.P. 23(cXl). In this case the request that the action be allowed to proceed as a class
action was not even made until over two years after the original, uon-class-action complaints were
filed, and more than fifteen months after plaintiffs had succeeded in delaying their response to a
summary judgment motion addressed to the merits of those original complaints.
Similarly, the notion that the decision whether an action may be maintained as a class
action should be made without consideration of the merits of the case derives from the same RULE
23 language arid, marc importantly, stems from a concern that die representative plaintiff not be
allowed to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it. S&*
Eisen v« Carlisle & Jaequedin, 417 U.S.1S6, 177*78,94 S.Ct 2140,2152, 40 L-Ed2d 732 (1974).
Here, the Hares have already had the benefit of over two years of discovery relevant to their class
action allegations and, because the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for a class
action ate met is always on the plaintiffs, it is impossible to consider their request in a vacuum:
5

the court Would expect the Hares1 motion for class certification to identify at least some evidence
supporting their allegations of fraudulently-prepared, boilerplate reports. Cf. Stair K Equifax
Check Scrvs., Inc., 181 F_3d 832, 835(7thCir-1999) ("Disputes about class certification cannot
be divorced from the merits—indeed, one of the fundamental unanswered questions is whether
judges should be influenced by their tentative viey/ of the merits when deciding whether to certify
adassC-]11)
Because substantial discovery has already taken place in this case, and enabled the Hares
to respond to State Farm's motion for paitial summary judgment, there is ample material to review
in considering whether there are question* of face common to the class, and whether the Hares9
cfoims are typical of the class claims. On these points the court quotes the Hares1 arguments for
certification in their entirety:
In this case, the plaintiffs are alleging that the information relied
upon by Medical Biomechanics when producing its reports were
based upon inaccurate, deceptive, askewed [sic] and baseless
information. The defendants may argue ibat each individual
plaintiff had their own unique medical situation, however, the
Information relied upon [by] State Farm and Medical
Biomechanics is common throughout its reports. As a result,
there are common issues of fact throughout the class.
., * The plaintiffs arc asserting as outlined above that Stace Farm.
and Medical Biomechanics conspired together to defend them our
of medical payments due ihem under their policy of insurance with
State Farm. Ihis is the same claim which is being made by the class
m this instance, AS a result, die Court should find that the claims of
Ruth and Wesley Hare are typical of the claims vducb ^ill be
presented by members a£ the class.
Plaintiffi* Motion to Certify Class Action at 8-9 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear thai without any evidence suggestive of ^oilctplacc^-type reports, the
Hares cannot satisfy the second and third threshold requirements of a class action, that is, that
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there are questions of fact common to the class and thai the class representatives' claims are
typical of the class claims. Put another way, if each medical report prepared by BMI is unique to
foe particular facts of the accident involved, instead of a boilerplatereportproduced from stock
phrases, then the accuracy of every one of the 606 reports the Hares sec as proxies for the plaintiff
class would have to be individually analyzed. This is precisely the opposite of the scenario
envisioned by the Tecpiiremcnt that there be questions of fact common to the class. Rather than
showing that their claim would be typical of common feet questions, the Hares" filings in support
of their request for class certification indicate the necessity of this type of mdmdualized review.
For example, in their fisst supplemental filing [docket entry 66] the Hares argue mat the
report of their Expert, Dr. Owdea Turner, shows that the BMI report at iisue in this case was
incomplete because it ignored the most significant biomechanical forces that occurred daring the
Hares" accident, misrepresented certain data from the medical literatare and ignored ether telecast
literature not supportive of BMP* findings, and used data that was "largely irrelevant" to the facts
of the accident, an of which "fell in line wrth State Farm's previous practices" as "outlined
numerous times to the Court" Plaintiffs' Supplemental Support at 2. The reference to State
Faun's "prior history" relates to the Hares' effort to convince the court, using newspaper articles
regarding state mvesdgations of State Farm's claims practices and two other lawsuits against State
Farm (which arc approximately tan years old and do not involve BMD that State Farm must be
engaging in fraudulent behavior in the present case.
Those efforts are misplaced. The relevant facts are the facts at issue in tins case and the
court views Dr. Turner's report (attached to m b t i f t ' supplemental filing) as indieativc of why
the possible claim of each potential member of the class would rest on unique, rather than
common, questions offset Dr. Turner found BMTs report "mcomplete" because it focused on

the forces caused by the side-swiping impact between the Hares' auto and the truck involved in
the accident, radicr than the forces occurring after the Hates' auto left the road, which Dr. Turner
believed to be the more rignificaot forces itrvolvei Dr. HarefoundBMTs use of studies and data
from the literature misreprcscntarivc and "largely irrelevant" because BMI extrapolatedfromdaca
derived from staged low-speed, tear-end crashes which, in Dr* Turners opinion, bear little
resemblance to real-world accidents.
Although Dr. Turner's opinion may be correct, bis critique of BMTs report; and the Hares'
reliance on that critique to prove State Farm and EMl's "fiwdulenT behavior, shows two things
critical to the class certification issue. First, that although the methodology end science used in
formulating its report may have been faulty, BMI did cruder the individual circumstances of the
Hares* accident rather than simply producing a "canned^ report.3 Second, that flic any ''fraud" or
4ft

felsityw in BMTs report can only be demonstrated by individualized expert analysis of the report

itself. Dr. Turner admitted this in his deposition, in the following question and answer:
Q: You would ^gree with me, wouldn't you, Doctor, that it would
take some specialised training not unlike your specialized training in
order to discern even die reportsfromMedical Biomechanics, Inc.,
the complaints that you have about those reports, the deficiencies
that tfaey have in your view, is that ligjit?
A: Yes, that** correct
Deposition of Charles Turner at 32 (Ex- X to Plaintifis' Response to Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment).

3

In conjunction with, the pending motion for summary judgment the couit has read BMTs
report and ii contains a detailed discussion of the circumstances of the aeddent, the Hares'
complaints, and medical trcamient received by die Hares.
8

In shaft, rather than showing that there is a class of potential plaintiffs with claims thai rest
on common facts, the Haras have shown that each of the at least 606 possible claims would
rebuke searching expert review of individualized Sets. This is not fodder for a class action.
In coigunctioii^iih their request to certify this action as a class action, the Hares haw also
moved to amend their complaint to addBMI as a drfendant. Although leave to mv—H a
complaint should be freely gcauted whan justice requires, see FED. It CIV. P. 15(a), the only
justification offered by die Hares for their request is diet the addition of BMI is necessary if this
action is to be maintained^ a class action- As the court has determined thatfibeaction win not be
ccriSed as a class action, BMTs presence is unnecessary. In nacbing this conclusion, the court is
also mindful of the fact that in requesting leave to amend; the Hares assert thai in £mr original
complaint they alleged the existence of a conspiracy between State Farm and BML The Hares
have offered no explanation for then waiting nearly two and ahalf years to addBMI as a named
defendant
For the foregoing reasons, the Hares' motions to certify class action and amend complaint
to add an additional defendant (docket entries 63-1, 63-2) are both DENIED; State Farm's
motions to postpone class certification (docket entry 64) and to strike plaintiffs1 supplement is.
support of claas certification (docket entry 70) are both DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED.
ENTER: March 2tf, 2001
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JttET/»&

HERBERT OSTROF, et aL

MAY 212007
*

Plaintiffs
*

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY

Civil No. PJM99-298B

*
a
a
a

Defendant
OPINION
PlaintLSs Herbert Ostnof and LaCountess B- Corbitt, on behalf of themselves and
oti&xs similarly situated, have filed soil against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
As insureds under automobile insurance policies of State Fan**, they allege that, pursuant to an
illegal plan of State Farm, tfaey were denied reimbursementformedical bills and lost income tinder
the personal injury protection (PIP) provision of the policies. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Class
Certification, State Farm has filed a Modem to Disqualify Ostrof as Putative Class Representative,
and Plaintiff have filed a Motion to Add Class Representatives.
The Court will DENYPlainttfiS' Motionfcr Class C&tfficatiojt, which MOOTS State
Farm's Motion to Disqualify Ostrof and Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Class Representatives.
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L
Section § 19-505 of the Insurance Article of the Mmyland Code requires thai any
motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold or delivered ill Maryland must contain, unless
waived, coverageformedical, hospital and disability benefits, includinglost income. This coverage
is commonly known as personal injury protection (HP) coverage. PIP coverage provides for the
payment of all reasonable and necesssuy medical expenses and 85% of tost income which arise out
of an accident involving the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle and 'which are incurred "within
3 years after the accident or incident, The coverage applies regardless of whether the insured was
atfeultin causing the accident givingriseto the medical expenses and lost income. The purpose of
the coverage is to permit the speedyrecoveryof monies without the delays oftortlitigation and to
permit an injured individual to recover without regard to firahL
Plaiotiflfe allege that they, as well as members of their class, either purchased PIP
coverage from State Farm as part of their own motor vehicle liability insurance contract were
covered under a State Farm policy which contained PIP coverage; that they and their class were
involved in.an accident during the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle and incurred reasonable
and necessary medical expenses and/or lost income as a result of injuries sustained in the accident
or incident; and that they and their class timely submitted claimstoState FarmforPEP benefits under
the aforesaid contracts which State Farm "wrongfully denied in whole or part
Plaintiffs contend that State Farm deliberately engaged in a course of deceptive
conduct as to them and each member of their class. Stale Farm,ttieysay, urged them to accept PIP
coverage, suggesting it would evaluate PEP claims fairly objectively, thoroughly, ptomptly and in
accordance with Maryland law. but at the same time concealed from them the existence of a
2
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"caramon end fraudulent plan, scheme or practice" that made each of those representations false.
Among State Farm's allegedly deceptive and unfeirpracticcswerc(l)theuseof compiiterprograms
•with databases that arbitrarily determined that the bills of Plaintiffe and the class exceeded
hypodietical amounts charged by hypothetical providers in hypothetical geographical regions; (2)
the engagement of consultants who consistently submitted reports resulting in a denial of benefits
to Plaintiffs and the class; and (3) bo the extent that State Farm occasionally required Plaintiffe or
members of the class to submit to medical examinations, the engagement of physicians who
routindy provided reports whir h State F

and

the class's medical bills. In ail these instances, Stale Farm was allegedly aware of the inadequacy
and lack of objectivity of its investigation and review of the PIP claims.
As of October 13, 1998, Plaintiff Herbert Ostrof had a motor vehicle liability
insurance contract with Stare Farm Which included PIP coverage hi the amount of $2,500,00. On
that date he was iqjutcd in a motor vehicle accident, incurring medical bills in consequence. He
alleges that he submitted his claims for PEP benefits to State Faun in timelyfeshionbut that State
Farmrefusedto pay at least $87.00 of medical bills due to certain of his health care providers.
As of May 26,1996, Plaintiff LaCountess B. Carbitt's father had a PIP policy with
State Faun in the amount of $10,000.00- On that dale she was injured in a motor vehicle accident,
incurring medical bills in caring for her uyuries as welt as losing income as a result. Corbitt alleges
that after timely submitting her claim for PIP benefits, State Farm refused to pay her medical bills
and lost income benefits totaling at least $5,984.00,
Flaintiffo bring this action on behalf of themselves and ask the Court to certify the
following class:
3
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All individuals who were injured in an acrodentari^
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, who (a)
timely and properly submitted in accordance with State Farm's
insurance policies and/or Maryland law, a claim for personal injury
protection and/or medical payments benefitstoDefendant State Farm,
under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by State Farm
and governed by Maryland law, which claim was denjpd» in whole or
part on or after August 18,1996, based on use of jajmputerized fee
review schedule? or medical record reviews (conducted by
consultants retained and paid by State FarmX and who (b) received or
were tendered an amount of benefits which was lesa than the stated
PIP policy limits and the amount claimed. !
They also ask for certification of a subclass:
"Allindividuals encompassed in the 'post-policy purchase loss' class,
who also, from August IS, 1996 to tiie date of final judgment*
purchased a Stale Farm automobile insurance policy which contained
HP coverage and which was governed by Maiyland law/*
Plaintiflfe proceed pursuanttoFed. R. Civ. P. 23,

2

i

This is the class as defined by Plaintiffs in their Reply to Defendant's Opposition to
their MotionforClass Certification. The class proposed in the Plaintif&a Complaint, however, is
far broader and includes any individual who submitted a claim for PIP benefits to State Farm,
governed by Maryland law, whose claim was denied in whole or part after August 18s 1989. After
State Farm pointed out in its Opposition to the Motion that the proposed class might include
claimants whose claims were barred by limitations, or who were never in an accident or were not
injured at all, or whose policies had expired or who bad failed to submit PIP applications or other
required documentation on a timely basis, Pl&intxfis redefined the class in their Reply.
The Court notes that amendments to complaints ordinarily are not accomplished by a party *s mere
declaration to that effect in the course of a reply brief and thai the proper vehicleforeffecting such
an amendment is by means of an amended complaint. See FedL R. Civ. P. 15(a); Local Rule 103.6.
However, inasmuch as the Court is denying class certification in any case, as a matter ofjudicial
economy it will assume that Hie Complaint, has been appropriately amended.
2

The Complaint, originallyfiledin the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and
removed to this Court* actually seeks certification pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-231 *
Since the Maryland rule is in pari materia with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and since the
4
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A) All class actions in federal court must satisfy the following conditions of Fed.
R. Civ. P, 23(a):
1)

Nnmerosity:

Tbc claim muse, be so numerous that joinder of all individual

members is "impracticable (23(a)(1));
2) Commonality; There must be questions of law andfeetcoxnmon to the class
(23(a)(2));
3) Typicality: The claims crffoe class reptwemtati^
of the claiss (23(a)(3)); and
4) Adequacy ofJRenresentatioii: The proposed class representatives must be able
to fairly and adequately proiect the interests of the class members (23(a)(4)).
Inadditiontomeeting the requirements ofRcle 23(a)* aproposed class representative
must meet one of die several grounds for maintaining the cause of action set out in Fed, &. Civ, P,
23(b), Ostrof and Corbitt have optedtoproceed principally under 23(b)(3), wfaichxequircs that they
demonstrate that questions of law or fact common to the class "predominate" over questions
effecting die individual members and that, on balance, a class action would be "superior" to other
methods available for adjudicating the controversy.3

parties have argued the case in terms of the federal rule, tbe Court's analysis will proceed on the
basis of thefederalrule*
a
Plaintiffs also argue, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 23(bXl)(A), that there is a risk of
prejudice from separate actions establisldng incompatible standards of conduct for State Farm and
that adjudications with respect to individual members of the class might be dispositive of the
interests of other members not parties to these adjudications. Plaintiffs, however, do not appear to
press this argument with particular vigor andfcrgDodzeason.As State Farm points out, the present
S

u/,«/ux mui> I J : U » W U L 309 766 6807
05/22/2001 13:39 FAX 202 263 3300

STATE FARM CORP LAW E8
MB&P WASH DC

©016
®007

DCRFaXl * Pa 7/24

B)

Ostrof and Corbitt maintain that they satisfy &U Rule 23's prerequisites.

Ad for numerosity, they allege a class of "hundreds if not thousands11' of State Faun
insureds who applied for PIP benefits under insurance policies issued by State Farm, the joinder of
whose individual lawsuits would be difficult and inconvenient
As for commonality, they cite the "common course of deceptive conduct37 on the part
of State Farm as well as several characteristics they say they share with the proposed class, namely
(a) PIP contracts and coverage; (b) the occurrence of accidents or incidents; (c) timely submission
erf claims; (d) thefirilureof Stan? Farm i4> undertake an objective review of their claims, and the
arbitrary denial or reduction of those claims baaed on computer analyses; sad (e) fraudulent
representations by State Farm that claims would be paid regardless of fault based on an objective
review in compliance with law, together with concealment of this common scheme or plan to
wrongfully deny orreducethe PIP claims. Additional common questions of law are said to pertain
to the nature and extent of afiduciaryduty State Fann purportedly owed to Plaintiffs under Maryland
law to process PIP claims Surly, promptly, and in accordance with law.
As for the typicality of their claims. Plaintiffs argue thax they share the common
characteristics of the class. Again, they, as well as others, are PIP insureds with State Farm, were

suit seeks only money damages, whereas the general practice is to certify aRule 23(b)(1) (A) action
only in cases seeking injunctive or declaratory i*Jie£ See, e,g„ Jh Re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig^
829FJ2d 1539,1544 (11th Cir. 1987), Because only money damages are sought, the Court sees no
risk that Staxe Farm will be subject to inconsistent standards of conduct such as might affect, for
example, a party maintaining an alleged nuisance who is subject to individual litigations of several
riparian owners. See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 1996 Amendment
Subdivision (b)(1) Clause (A), The only possibility is that State Farm might be found liable in this
case and not in another (or Vice versa). However, the laterjudgment would not be incompatible with
the earlier judgment because, by paying the earlier (or later) judgment, State Farm could act
compatibly with both. See Zimmerman v. Be//, 800 F.2d 386,389 (4th Cir, 1986).
6
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injured in accidents or incidents, submitted timely claims, and were denied payments based on cfae
same wrongful course of conduct by State Fann, ie. its "practice of arbitrarily reducing or denying
PIP claims by using computet programs and hired-gun consultants."
As for the adequacy of representation, counsel for Plaintiffs assume there is no
challenge to their own qualifications to serve as class counsel and focus instead on the adequacy of
the proposed class representatives, that is, on the mutuality of their interests and those of the
proposed class members. Because of their "common and obvious interest," Plaintiffs submit that
ttey will actively seek vindication of the class members' rights They ? insert that their interests a*e
not antagonistic to those of the class because their interests axe held in common, because they have
no conflict of interest ("Defendant,'' say Plaintiffs, "cannot produce my evidence showing aconflict
of interest** on their part), because they sufferfromno incapacity, and because there are no defenses
unique or personal to them.
Plaintiffs also argue that their case satisfies both the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), the former by reason of the "overriding common liability issues in
this case," the latter primarily because of the relatively easy manageability of the proceeding.
C) Sta^ Fan» opposes Plaintiff d l e ^
there is a commonality oflaw or i^^
ofthe putative class representatives are typical ofthose ofthe proposed members, or that the putative
representatives can adequately represent the class. As far as FedL R. Civ, P. 23(bX3) is concerned,
Stars Farm denies that common issues predominate or that, on balance* class certification would be
superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,

7
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Above all, State Farm denies thai it has engaged in a common scheme of deception
relative to the processing ofFlP claims. While it concedesihal PIP msweds in Maryland are entitled
to recover reasonable expenses for necessary treafaneat of arcident-reiaied injuries, it argues that in
practice a significant number of such claimants seek reimbursement for fees that are either not
accident-related oar, if they are, that are not necessary or reasonable. Accordingly, State Farm
believes that Mmeaa entitles itlo employ a variety ofmeasures to verify those claims, an effort they
contend that aefc^^

Among the methods State

Fazm has used in this ^gard axe individualized review of claims by a claims representative (and
sometimes by a clam 3 supervisor), followed by computer reviews, utilization reviews, and/or
medical examinations, all designed to check the claimed costs against usual and customary costs for
the claimed costs in the locality where lite service is rendered. Computer reviews involve the use
of a database which compiles information regarding fees provided for a wide array of services in a
partiaalargeogrsphic area. By comparing a proposed charge with the customary chargeforthe same
service in the given area as established by the database, State Farm contends it is able to determine
how die charge measures up. If, under all the circumstances, the charge is deemed unreasonable,
reimbursement for the PIP claim is denied. During the time that State Farm used the computerized
review method in Maryland, * its computer program Sagged any charges above the 35th percentile

State Farm indicates that it stopped using computer fee review programs In March
2000 for reasons unrelated to thefilingof this lawsuit. It concedes, however* that shotdy after, in
April 2000, the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) issued a bulletin addressing the issue of
computerfeereview programs. In it, the MIA stated that insurance companies ought not to rely on
such programs as the solemethod ofassessing the reasonableness offees bur pointed out that uin and
of itself, * * * it is not unlawful &r a PIP insurer to apply and utiii2e a fee review schedule3'
generated by computer programs. State Farm contends that it has never relied solely <m computer
fee reviews to determine whether the charges are reasonable but has used it simply as one of several
a
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of charges for the same service In the particular area where it was rendered and then — subject to
giving the requesting health caie provider an opportunity to justify the higher fee — conditionally
reduced the fee to Ac maximum customary charge, UtilizaUoni^vicr^ (presumably what Plamuffs
mea» by "medical records reviews") consist of reviews by afirmorfirmsof medical professionals
with past experience in the evaluation of personal injury claims- In conducting their reviews, the
reviewers consider the medical propriety of prescrib^l treatment as a cross-check against possibly
unnecessary services by fee-for-service health caie providers. Medical examinations by private
practice physicians are conducted to verify the insureds physical condition, the causal relationship
between automobile accidents and injuries* and the propriety ofthe prescribed treatment. Rejecting
the characterisation of these methods as part of a deceptive course of conduct, State Farm defends
them as wholly appropriate means to prevent unreasonable claims, whether fraudulent or merely
unnecessary or excessive.
State Farm also challenges the proposition that the putative class shares any
commonality of facts in regard to their HP claims. Each claimant's situation, State Farm argues, is
unique and would require individualized proof of an erroneous coverage determination as well as
proof of actual injury resulting from that detJaooatoatioiL Thus, Stale Farm suggests that at a
minimum each claimant would have to prove that:
•

he or she was covered under a State Farm HP policy;

•

he or she was involved in a covered accident that resulted, in bodily injury
and/or lost wages;

•

the treatment received for any injury "was ^necessary11;

steps in evabiatmg an individual's medical claims.
9
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the charges for necessary treatment were "teasoflablc";
•

the claimant adequately documented his or her claim and complied with
reasonable requests for medical examinations;
State Farm denied coverage for all or part offtatnecessarytreatment or paid
less than those reasonable charges;

»

the amount ofthe bill submitted by the claimant was within policy limits; and

-

the daimant suffered damage from Stele Farm's incorrect coverage decision,
La. he or she was actually requiredtopay the rejected bills,5

Additionally, insofar as Plaintiffs and the proposed class aj^s propot&idiag a theory
ofrecoverysounding infeaud,State Farm argues that each daimant would have to show that he or
she reasonably relied upon a knowing misrepresentation by State Farm about the extent of its PIP
coverage.
Furthermore, based on the damages Plaintiffi have claimed in their pleadings,
inherently individualized inquiries pertaining to damages would havetoinclude;
*

Whether the individual claimant inclined "additional losses and damages in
pursuit o f PIP damages;

•

Whether the individual claimant suffer "consequential damages" due to
"emotional stress, concern, and worry;11 and
Whether the individual claimant is entitled to punitive damages.

A claimant would still be entitled to PIP benefits even ifhe or she had also recovered
collateral medical or hospital benefits. Pmaa v. S t a t e s ^ fti* ^n12001 WL 350239 (Md. 2001).
Bui the Couzt understands State Farm to be referring to cases in which no one would have paid the
bill; the health care provider would simply have withdrawn any claim to die questioned amount.
10
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State Farm continues: Assuming tturt the proposed class shan^ a commoafirstset
of issues, individualized hearings on each class member's claims would still be required. Far
example, to the extent that a claimant might be seeking reimbursement for multiple injuries that
occurred close in time (e.£ Proposed Class Plaintiff Corbitt was in two accidents within S days7
time), the claimant would have to demonstrate that a distinct accident caused a distinct injury
entitling the claimant to a distinct quantum of medical treatment and distinct payment. It would also
be necessary to know whether the clamant submitted a cbdm that was in fiact underpaid and, if so,
whether the claimant was himself or herself subject to a claim for payment by the health care
provider. Further, assuming State Farm owed the class a fiduciary duty to process claims fisiirly and
promptly, it would be necessary to determine on an individualized basis whether that duty was
breached by the particular method used and whether 1he breach resulted m

If

the utilization review method caused the breach, for example, the trier of fact would have to
determine whether the physician who reviewed the claimant's file acted properly and whether the
allegedly improper review actually caused a claimant to receive less compensation than he or she
should have received- Even assuming the existence of a common scheme to wrongfully deny or
reduce claims, each individual claimant would still havetoprove that in his cxr her own case the
claim was m feet wrongfully denied or reduced.
State Farm also contends that the proposed Class Plaintiffs havefelledto prove chat
their claims and defenses are typical or that they would fairly and adequately represent the class*
Ostrof; who is the subject of a separate motion to disqualify, has apparently never had to pay his
health care providers the amount he was denied. Hius State Farm indicates that it paid a total of
$1,905.76 cither to Ostrof or his health care providers and that only three of his claimed
11
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reimbursements for medical expenses were reduced, and then by a total of only 587,24. This came
after a review of Ostrof s claims flic, including bis medical records and billing information, and a
comparison of the expenses with a medical icsemch database reporting tte prevailing Jfeeaforthe
claimed services intheixslcvaiiteeogTaphici^gicm. SiateFami, moreover, notified Ostrvf a medical
providers in writing of the adjustments it proposed to their bills and explained the rationale it had
used to determine the appropriate amounts;, advising that if the providers disagreed with the
adjustment, they should submit additional documentation- Since the providers submitted no such
documentation aor did they sue Ostroffortheir fees, Stale Farm claims he has suffered no damages
and thus lacks standing to make a claim.
As for proposed Class Plaintiff Corbitt, State Farms argues chat it also has defenses
unique to her that would be a i ^
It points out, for example, that Corbftt was involved in an automobile accident S days prior to the
accident for Which She s e e k s recovery here, making ft uncertain w h i c h accident c a u s e d which injury

State Farm also notes Cnrbitt's deposition Testimony which reveals thai she may have obtained a
double recovery for lost wages for the period of May 25 to June 8* 1996, which would subject her
ta a unique defence of unclean hands. It suffiests that thro is a considerable!^
physical therapist may have suhmitted duplicative bills seeking for double payment for the same
treatment applied to Corbitt following her two accidents. Further, since Corbitr submitted a PIP
claim under her father's insurance policy, she is an improbable designee to assert on her own, muck
less on bcball of others, any breach of contract or fraud claim.
Stale Farm suggests that balhC^
or understanding of their lawsuit Ostrof^forexample, could not remember if he had ever read the
12
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ponionofhisStaiEFannixjli^
ComplaintinthiflauiL Cocfaitt could pot recall who may have maderepresentationsto her or when
they might have been ffiade. Both wens uncertain asto what damages they were claiming. When
asked whether she had filed tax returns fori 996, pirauraably a relevant inqtriiyinastnijchasttielost
wage claims she aenks in this case occun«d in that year, Corbitt asserted a privilege under the Fifth
Amendment andrefused,to answerFinally, assuming Plaintife have mot each of Rule 23(a)*s requirement^ including
that of commonality, Slate Farm disputes that they can sntisfy Rule 23(b)(3)*a requirements that
common issues '"predominate" and that class certification be " ^ w i n r * to other methods for the feir
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. While it well may he efficient to eliminate the
requirement that members of the Plaintiff Class adduce evidence in support of each element of their
claims, State Farm says the consequence would be to deprive it of the opportunity to present
individualized evidence andraiseindividualized defenses. Any economy of time, effort and expense
achieved by proceeding as class action in this case, would necessarily sacrifice procedural fairness
in derogation of State Farrrr s due process rights. Finally, State Farm submits the proposed Class
Plaintiffs have failed td present wiarfcable plan formanaging this case, belying any assertion that this
^wdd be a relatively easy case to manage,
IIL
It is *^vell settled in the Fourth C ^
burden of establishing therightto such certification under Rule 23." Bostron v„ Ajrfkl, 182 F JUX
188, 192, CL6 (D.Md. 1998). There is no presumption in favor of such certification as ""Would
operate to remove the burden of establishing [a]rightto class action treatment fiom the plaintiff ***
13
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and impose it on the defendant or defendauter Windham v* American Brands Inc.»565 F.2d 59,65,
iu6 (4th Cir. 1997} (*» **wc>. Set also In Re AM Rabbins Co., 880 F^d 709, 728 (40L Or. 1989)
(abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Prods. Inc. v- Windsor, 521 U S . 591 (1997).
Plaintiffs, therefore, have the burden of establishing the four elements of Rule 23(a)
-raniuerositya commonality, typicality and adequacy of copccscuCacioxL. See, £.#,, Amcftem, 521 U jS.
at 613-14. The Court considers these elements first SeeG*n. Tel Co. v. Falcon* 457 U.S, 147.161
(1982). Only if Plaintiffs caa establish these is the Court obliged to consider the requirements of
Rude 23(b)- Amchem, 521 tLS. at 614.
A)

Numerosity is not contested by State Form and the Court will take it as

B)

As for commonality, the Fourth Circuit has held ^cextificarton is proper only

established.

when a detemriiiatrve critical issue overshadows all other issues/" Stottv. Hav»arth% 916 F^2d 134,
145 (4th CIr. 1990). "[QJuestion[s] [that are] in no vray dispositive and [which] simply p&opel the
action into a posture where judicial scrutiny is necessary for just adjudication73 are not sufficient
under Rule 23(aX2), 14,916 F,2d at 145. 'The disparate nature ofthe Jproposed class member's]
claims precludes class treatment" Braussardv. Meir&ke Disc Muffler Shops Inc., 155 F 3 d 331,
344(4xhCir.l998)- See also Peoples v. J T a ^ v ^ ^ u * ^ ^
O* representative plaintiff cannot establish commonality under [Rule 23(a)(2)] if t i c coltti must
investigate ea*& plaintiffs individual claim.")
As set forth in their Reply to State Farads Opposition to the Motion to Certify,
Plaintiffs propose what they take to be a simple scheme for the trial of this case:
If a jury finds thai it is wrong to reduce claims [based on computer
programs and record reviews], all that will have to be determined at
1*
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that poise is how many claims in the relevant time period weire in fici
reduced on these bases, and whattbe amounts ofxhe reductions "were,
Then, ifDefcndant cannot produce any additional evidence, obtained
prior to the decision to deny benefits, which supports these
reductions i ^ i n aider to mea
presumptive reasonableness and necessity of each FTP claim, - then
Defendant will simply have to pay whatever the amount of the
rcduction^vuoncachclaint At thai point, having been found to fall
short, at the time of its claim decision, of meeting its burden to rebut
the presumptive reasonableness and necessity of each relevant PIP
claim, Defendant will not be able to reopen each case and conduct
fbfl blown individual rnim-trials cm the issue of reasonableness and
necessity* (Emphams in original; fewxbaote omitted)
But, as State Femm emphasiws over a ^
insurer pay up to tfac limits of the insureds policy "the reasonable and necessary expenses [for
specified medical services] thai ansa from a motor vehicle accident and that are incurred within 3
years after the accident," Maryland Code Annotated [Insurance], § 19-5QS(bX2)C0, **"* **8S%

of

income lost? BS a result of such, accident* IdL+ Section 19-505(b)(2)(ii)- Merely to recite the terms
of the stature, in the Court's view, is to demonstrate which side has ihe better part of this argument.
Quite simply, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion urged by State Farm that the case is rife wtth
individu3li2fidmquirie3, Fundamejatxd question?nece&sar^^

Was

there in fact an accident? Was the claimant injured? Was the event adequately documented? Was
review of the claim based on computer review alone? Utilization review alone? Medical review
alone? On some combination of these? Did the claimant Imve a pre-existing medical condition?
Was The treatment pxescribed&r the claimant necessary? Was it excessive? Were the health care
provider's bills reasonable? Was there duplication in billing? Was fraud iavolved? Did the
individual claimant actually hafve tn pay tkg ammmf ferte F^Ti fVmfrd? Has the claimant been sued
for the fee? And so the litany proceeds. Common sense, no less than doe process, makes such
15
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[pgiTirf^g relevant. The Court is unable to find in this case the commonality that Rule 23(a)(2)
demands before a class can be certified*
Wetc that not enough^ Proposed 0
are typical of the proposed class. Generally speaking, typicality involves consideration of the
similarity between proposed class pJainiifis* legal and remedial thrones and those of the persons
they pmport to represent Lighibournv. County of El Paso, r^,118F3d421,426(5thGhr.l997).
Ttedassrepwssentafivc^ustbop
injniyafi the class membeiB.^ Gen. Tet. Co,. 457UJS. at 156 (1982), Accordingly, the party s^sking
to represent the class must be able to prove actual injury to him or herself, as opposed to other
members of the class. O "Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 48S> 494 (1974). Although it is not necessary
that all class members suffer die same injury as the class representatives, see, e.g., Rosario v.
Livadttls* 963 F-2d 1013,1018 (7th Cir, 1992% where a purported class Representative is subject to
a unique defense that cannot be asserted against other members of the class (other than, minor
discrepancies), typicality may be lacking. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. V- Merrill Lynch Pierce,
Fanner & Smith, jfoc, 903 ¥Jd 176, 180 C2nd Cir. 1990).
The Conrc has alieady referred to proposed Class Plaintiff Ostrof s situation. He, it
appears, is either not a member of the proposed class may be subject to a unique defense. It i5
uncontested that he has never had to pay his health care providers the amounts that were dnniedhim.
No suits for the fees are pending against him nor, apparently, are any such suits imminent. See
McGffl v. Rare Farm Mut Aula Ins. Co., 526 N.W.Zd \2y 14 (Mich, Ct. App. 1994)(finding
proposed class plaintiffs claims atypical: "[There is] no evidence that PlaintiiEs have suffered
iqjnry ss a result of Defendants' partial payment of tfaeirmedical bills; nor is any injury threatened.")
16
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p^fr r <^ tupiqi^ *r» PMptiff rvirKitt have also been noted. Since she was involved
ia two automobile ai»e«frf«fttg only cdght days apart, she would seed to prove which accident or
inadent gave ri» to what quantum of injury. Furthermore, at least golorably, it appears that she may
have submitted duplicate bills to Stare Farm asking for paymentfijra single treatment tendered in
conseqeenceofthe two accidrats and possibly collected
since her PIP claim was submitted under herfifllxeff^iosuiancepolicy, it is dear that she could not
assert a breach of contract claim nor eeuld she have been the victim of any fraudulent
misrepresentation regarding the extent of Stale Farm's PIP coverage- *
The final prerequisite under Rule 23(a) is that the persona representing the proposed
class must be able "fairly and adequately to protect the interests" of all members of the class.
Representation £s deemed "adequate"* if the attorneys representing tbe class are qualified and
competent, see In Re Agent Orange Prod Liab.Litig„m S00F2d 14, l8(2udCir. 1986), and the class
representatives are not disqualified by reason of interests antagonistic to the rest of the class. See
lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pfcvures> Inc., SS2 F,2d 507, 512 (9fli Cix. 1978).

Presumably in recognition of the fragility of their claims to be certified as class
representatives^ Plaintiffs at oral argument handed up a motion stmkftng to add four new class
representatives, all described as individuals who would vigorously pursue the action in the interest
of The class. Whether or not a motion to add olass repress
yet come into existence, see, &g_, Dietrich v. Bauer, 76F.Supp.2d312T 326 (S J3.N.Y, 1999X Stale
Faixa argues persuasively tha
undue delay, even if typicality and the adequacy ofthe current PlamtiEfe to serve as Class Plaintifis
wer« the Court's only concerns. As with Plaintiff Ostrof and Corbitt, State Faun would also be
eotrttfid to determine whether the claims of the parties proposed to be added would be typical of the
class and whether they would be adequate representatives. Discovery, however, has closed, briefs
have been filed, and the case has been argued. Adding further named plaintiffs at this time would
therefore clearly be prejudicial to State Faun. See In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liab.
Lttig., 163 F JLD 258,260 (RIX Tax. 1995) ("die addition of [more] plamtifis at this late date would
unfiririy prejudice the defendants.").
17
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Since State Faun raises no challenge to the qualifications and competency of
proposed class counsel, the Court need not address that matter.
As for tbe proposed class representatives, courts have disagreed over whether
knowledge on Ihrir part or lack of same is relevant in deterznixung the adequacy of their
representation of class interests. Compare Linder v. Litton Sys. Inc.* 81 FJLD, 14, 20-22 (DMd.
1978) (plaintiff deemed inadequate class representative because he knew nothing about the policies
and practice he was challenging in the lawsuit), -with Grace v. Perception Tsek. Corp.t 128 FJLD,
16i> 170 (D-Mass. ] 9S9) (class representatives7 memory lapses at deposidoa did oot render them
inadequate). At best, Plaintiffs* clwins of adequacy in this case begin less than au>#ieiously. Both
have displayed limited knowledge and understanding of this lawsuit. Ostrof could not remember
tending the Complaiat, nor which of his bills in question had been paid in full or part. Corbitt did
notknow how mnchmoney she was claiming for lost wages, -which injury she was being treated for,
or what medication she was taking.
But apart from that, there is an overlap between the requirement of adequacy of
iepwentation and the requirement of typicality. Gen. Tel Co., 457 U.S- at 157. As to both
requirements, if the proposed class representative's claim is subject to a unique defense, the court
may refuse to certify as class representative a plaintiff subject to that defense. See Hanoa v.
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F-2d 497, 508 (Mi Cir. 1992). Since O^trot as previously noted, would
be subject to the defense ttat he l ^
Fann and since Corbitt would be subject to distinguishing between the consequences of overlapping
injuries as well as possible double billing in connection with both wage and medical expense claims,

IS
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their quest for class representative designation is highly problematic. And this* of course; assumes
the other requirements of Rule 23(a) have otherwise been, met; which they have not.
Then there is the matter of Rule 23(b). Strictly speaking, if the proposed class fills
to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)*s ropriiemeni that common issues exist, the Court need sot consider Rale
23(b)'s najnirements. fine Brouss&rd, 1SS R3d at 337, n.3. But least there be any doubt, it is also
clear that the latterare also imfulffledbeje, la determining whether cox^
the court first identifier the substantive issues raised by the cause of action and Hie applicable
defenses, xhen inquires into the ;>xoo£relevant to each issue. Sitner v. Rias, 661 F,2d 655, 672 (7th
Cir. 19S1). What matters is not the number of common issues hut their significance. Mullen y.
Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 R3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 1999). Notably, "the predominance
criterion is Tar more demanding" than Rule 23(a)7s commonality reqiiireinenL Amchem, 521 U.Sat 623-24.
The Court has already remarked upon the ext<^ to wttch the claims of llie member
of the putative class in this case would involve distinct inquiries leading to distinct conclusions as
to each member. Since the Court has found insufficient commonality of issues for Rule 23(a)(2)
purposes, a fartjarj ill concludes thai such issues do not predominate in the case for 23(b)(3)
purposes. See, <-£_, Kohn v. Am. Hew. Found*.Inc., 178RILD.536,541 (D-Colo. 199B)(common
legal theories and claims did not predominate where individual inquiries were necessary). See also
HericUY. Premier Salons

Irttfn^

3 9 0 ( 4 * Ctr_ 1986) (quoting 7 A C Wright & A. Miller, Petted Practice and Procedure, § 1788 at
526 {2nd cd. 1986)) (The possibility of such individualized detexnunafcioiis would impose an
excessive managerial burden upon die district court *** "When individual rather than common
13
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issues predominate, the economy and efficiency of class action, treatment are lost and the need ibr
judicial supervision and the risk of confusion are magnified.")
As for the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that ihc class action device be superior to
individual lawsuits for resolving tbc dispute, the Rule listsfourfector^hearingonthe deterrniMtion.
a list not meant to be exhaustive. Of the few factors serf out in the Rule, two aie of particular
relevance here; The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class [FedL & Ch- P. 23(b)(3)(B)] and the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class suit £FedL R- Cxv. P. 23(b)(3)(D)]. Beyond
Ihe factors mentioned in the Rule, a coun may also consider such factors as the avsilabiHty of
alternative remedies that would be superior to a. class action, including relief through administrative
proceedings. See Brawn v. Biite Crass and Blue Shield of Michigan, J/ic, 167 F.RJD. 40,43 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
Plaintiffs7 case is contraindicaied based on each of these factors.
As to related litigation: An attorney whose finn has represented State Farm in a
number of lawsuits in Maryland involving PIP coverage, some ofivhich have involved the use of
a computer database, has submitted an affidavit indicating that State Farm has often succeeded in
defending such suits. Citing two cases from the District Court ofMaryl andforMontgomery County,
for example, the affidavit indicates that in both cases the judges ruled in favor Of State Farm,
agreeing that medical providers * bills were excessive and thai State Farm* with the assistance of
information provided its Medicado review, properly reduced them* Cases fern other Maryland
courts have been cited in which medical treatment was found to be unnecessary and where
reductions in the claims by State Farm were upheld. Several more cases of this type are saidtohave
20
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been tried in Maryland, t h e fact that these individual suits have been prosecuted highlights yet
again the rare problem w^

PIP claims

rendto be ofahi^yindMdnahzed nature. Individual suite i r a y t ^ ^
proceed. SeeHewhitt. 185 FJLD- at 211.221 CTTJhe existence of [non-class] litigation indicates
that some of the interested parties have decided that individual actions arc an acceptable way to
pn&sed and even may consider than preferable to a class action"). This also has hnpficafaons widi
respect to the manageability factor. Numerous individual issues as compared to class issues
obviously make a case much more difficult to manage.
Ultim-tfely Plaint
any differently from others where the necessity and reasonableness of medical treatment has been
at issue. Consistently in such cases joints have found individualized inquiries to predominate and
have declined certification. Ses, &g.9 Ross-Randolph v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. DKC 99-3344 at pp.
17-1 S(D.Md, May 1 1 , 2 M 1 ) ( ^ ^
payment; \.. Plaintiff site no authority, and the court has found none, that deals with certification
of a class of plaintiffs whose action is based on an insurer's failure to undertake a 'reasonable and
tiecesBaiy * analysis as to eachmBmber3s individual claims, and in which the court found certification
appitopriate"); Ammons v. Am. Family htuL Ins. Co., S97 P^d 860, 863 (Cote- C t App, 1995)
(holding class certification inappropriate in suit to recoup "reasonable and necessaty" transportation
expenses incurred for treatment of injuries arisingfiromautomobile accidents because "what is
'reasonable and necessary7 may depend on the particular circumstances ofindividual cases"); Ralph
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 835 5. W.2d 522, 524 (Mo. Ct. App* 1992) (same); McDonald v,
Pnuisntzal iky, Ca^ No. 95-C-S1S6,1999 WL 102796, at *4 (N,D. HI. Feb, 19,1999) (refiisingTo
21
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ceriLty a class action against insurer where '"reasonableness11 and "medical necessity" would have to
be dtftemincd on casc-by-caae basis); Hylaszekv. Aetna Life Ins. Co.* No, 9-0-5961, 1998 WL
381064, at mA (NJ>, Hi. July 1,1998) (commonality and manageability not satisfied where court
woidd be required "to conduct a serins of mini-trials to examineraimerousfactual issuer, including
* * * the medical necessity of [particular] treatment in each individual case"); Scatt v, Ambassador
Ins. Co.y 426 NJE-2d 952,95* (JUL App. CL 1981) ("adjudication of the named plaiatifis* claim [sic]
would not establish a Tight to mgovery in any of the other purported class members" because of
"necessity ofmaking individual factual ^termination* as to whether each cb&s member was 'legally
entitled7 to damages iium an uniostrred motorist for bodily injuries sustained11); Fi&satn v.
Ccmnartxcut Gen. LtfeXns. Co.,No. 93-C-916, 1994 WL 323313, at *6 (NJX ILL June 27,1994).
Finally, there is the matter ofthe availability of alternative remedies, particularly in
a case such ad this where a remedy is available from an administrative agency which has expertise
in a relevant field, such as the insurance industry. Iti such cases, allowing for pursuit of claims in
the administrative fbrum is often deemed superior tn aggregating all the claims into a class action
suit. Cf Alien v. State Farm Fire and Cos. Co., 59 F,Supp.2d 1217, 1224-27 (S JX Ala. 1999)
(dismissing proposed class action on primary jurisdiction grounds because evaluation of
appropriateness of insurance deductible "requires familiarity with the insurance industry and the
variety of factors analyzed in deciding a deductible—matters witbintbeConMrii^onei^s expertise:^
Id. at 1227)_ U appeals that for at least Iwoyearatto
been examining the appropriateness of the use ofcomputer programs by insurers to aid in the review
ofmedical claims, an inquiry in which StateFannand other inswap have participated. In particular,
this examination has involved investigation of cases ofindividuals whose PIP claims were revjowed
22.
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and rejected by variolas companies using computerizedfc©rcviewprogrtHBfl.Not only does the MIA.
have the authority to ardar individualized remedies if the circumstances warrant; it has apparently
indicated that it will exercise that authority. But if that is so, it is clear that adding a class action
overlay in federal court makes little sense. SeePatillo v. ScAlesinger* 625 F.2d 262,265 (9th Cir.
19S0) (rejecting class certification in favor of administrative procedures and noting advantages of
eliinmzting costs and attorneys fees associated with classfitjgatiocQ.in any event; as a supplement
to administrative proceedings, the small claims courts of the Maryland state system appear to be
perfectly adequate venues to consider the claims of State Farm1 a PIP kssdreds if and when disputed
arise over whether they are properly payable.
For all these reasons, the Motion for Class Cattification will be DENIED,
A separate Order utjplementmg this Opinion will be issued. 7

**«**. *JL*~
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May Z__^ 2001
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PETER J. MESSOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This decision MOOTS State Farm's Motion to Disqualify Ostrof as Putative Class
Representative as well as Plainties* Motion to Add Class Repxcscn&iives.
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CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED POLICY
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian of the records pertaining to the issuance of
pohcies by the Utah/Wyoming Divisions of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company of
Bloomington, Illinois.
I further certify that the attached policy, number 747 7527-A29-44, is a copy of the policy issued to
TUCKER, DEEVOY & MARIAN, 3290 W HANOVER PK DR, W VALLEY CITY, UT 84119,
together with endorsements issued subsequently and effective as follows based on our available records.
The policy was in effect on the accident date of AUGUST 5,1994.
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DEBBIE RICHMOND, CPCU
Underwriting Administrator

STATE OF COLORADO
COUNTY OF WELD
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of OCTOBER 2000.

'L.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

May 5,2002
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NAMED INSURED

4^-1342-50
TUCKER, DEEVOY ft ^ A R I A N
3 2 9 0 y HANOVER P< 9?
w VaLLEY C I T Y UT
84119
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POLICY NUMBER

747

POLICY PERIOD

J U L - 2 9 - 5 4 TO

A

7527-A29-V
JVJ-29-95

STATE FA^M o a y ^ - M T PLAN
NUMBER <J>5416
DO NOT PAY PREMIUMS SHCWN ON THIS ?A<SE.
SEPARATE STATEMENT ENCLOSED iF AMOUNT Db!
DESCRIBED

YEAR

VEHICLE

90

MAKE

HONDA

MODEL

CIVIC

BODY STYLE

2DR

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

JH»E&9360LS027634

CLASS

19331

COVERAGES (AS DEFINED IN POLICY)
SYMBOL-PREMIUM-COVERAGE NAME LIMITS OF LIABILITY

»2
025u
G^50
H
U

MEMBERSHIP

$134.30 sODILY INJURY/PROPERT Y DAMAGE LIABILITY
LIMITS Of LIABILITY -COVERAGE A-500ILY INJURY
EACH PERSON, EACH ACCIDE Ml
50,COO 3
1uG,G00
LIMITS OF LIABILITY -COVERAGE A- ROPE9TY DAMAGE
EACJ ACCIDENT
50 OQf
$26.00 MO-PAULT (SEE POLICY SCHEOUCE FOR LIMITS.)
SoG.oG $250 DEDUCTIBLE COMPR
$142.*Q $<:50 DEDUCTIBLE COLLI EHENSIVE
$2.40 EMERGENCY ROAD SERVIC SIGN
M . 5 G UNINSURED MOTOR VEHIC E
LIMITS OF LIABILITY u£
-U
EACH ACCIDENT
EACH »ERSON_
51,000
$3.00 UNDERINSURED MOTOR VE
25,000
LIMITS Of LIABILITY HICLE
-v»
EACH ACCIDENT
EACh PERSON,
20,000
10,000
$373.70 TOTAL *REMIU<*! PQR POLICY PERIOD JUL-29-^4 TO JAN-20-9*
$16.00

EXCEPTIONS AMD ENDORSEMENTS
FINANCED- METRO HES^ CR UN, 1715 W 700 H, SALT LAKE CITY UT 3*114-1301.
60B2P

AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT: ChANG£S-D£fINED taORDS; INSURED4S DUTIES
CQVEKAGES.

6uviR
£>3S5££,1

AMENDMENT Of DEFINED WORDS AND NC-fAULT-COVERAGE P.
AMENDMENT Of UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE U AJMD UNDERINaJR£D
*0^0R VEHICLE-COVERAGE W.
OWNED 3Y KIH TUCKER.

AS*

~ A* T"

hs

PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY IF YOU HAVE AN ACCIDENT, CONTACT YOUR STATE FARM AGENT
OR ONE OF OUR CLAIM OFFICES AT ONCE (SEE "REPORTING A CLAIM-INSURED'S DUTIES" IN THIS POLICY)

Authorized Representative
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Home Office, Bloomington, Illinois
INSURANCt

)

Mountain States Office •

3001 8th Avenue •

Greeley, Colorado 80638-0001

YOUR
STATE FARM
CAR
POLICY
Policy Form 9844.3

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS
A MUTUAL COMPANY
DEFINED WORDS
WHICH ARE USED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE POLICY
We define some words to shorten the policy. This makes it
easier to read and understand. Defined words are printed in
bold face italics. You can pick them out easily.
Bodily Injury — means bodily Injury to a person and
sickness, disease or death which results from it.
Car ~ means a land motor vehicle with four or more
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public roads. It
does not include:

b. you, your spouse or a relative who does not own
or lease such car is the driver.
3. any other person residing in the same household as
you, your spouse or any relative; or
4

an employer of you, your spouse or any relative.

Non-owned car does not include a car:
1. which is not in the lawful possession of the person
operating it; or
2. which has been operated by, rented by or in the
possession of an insured during any part of each of
the preceding 21 days; or
3. operated by an insured who has operated or rented
any car otherwise qualifying as a non-owned car
during any part of more than 45 days in the 365
days preceding the date of the accident or loss.

1. any vehicle while located for use as a dwelling or
other premises; or
2. a truck-tractor designed to pull a trailer or
semitrailer.

Car Business - means a business or job where the purpose
is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport, store or park land
motor vehicles or traders.
Insured — means the person, persons or organization defined
as insureds in the specific coverage.
Occupying - means in, on, entering or alighting from.
Loss - defined in sections IV and V.
Person - means a human being.
Newly Acquired Car - means a car newly owned by you Private Passenger Car — means a car:
or your spouse if i t
1. with four wheels;
1. replaces your car; or
2.
of the private passenger or station wagon type; and
2. is an added car and:
3.
designed
solely to carry persons and their luggage.
a. if it is a private passenger car, we insure all other
private passenger cars, or
Relative - means a, person related to you ox your spouse by
b. if it is other than a private passenger car, we blood, marriage, adoption or guardianship who lives with
insure all cars
you, including those who usually make their home in your
owned by you and your spouse on the date of its delivery household but temporarily live elsewhere.
to you or your spouse;
Spouse - means your husband or wife while living with you.
but only if you or your spouse:
Temporary Substitute Car - means a car not owned by you
1. tell us about it within 30 days after its delivery to
you or your spouse; and
2. if you or your spouse has more than one of our car
policies, tell us which one is to apply; and
3. pay us any added amount due.
Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned by or registered
or leased in the name of:

or your spouse, if it replaces your car for a short time. Its use
has to be with the consent of the owner. Your car has to be
out of use due to its breakdown, repair, servicing, damage
or bss. A temporary substitute car is not considered a
non-owned car.
Utility Vehicle - means a motor vehicle with:

1. a pickup, panel or van body; and
2. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less.
1. you, your spouse;
2. any relative unless at the time of the accident or
You or Your — means the named insured or named
loss:
insureds shown on the declarations page.
a. the car has been descnbed on the declarations
page of a liability policy some time within the Your Car - means the car or the vehicle descnbed on the
declarations page.
preceding 30 days; and
3
8443

DECLARATIONS CONTINUED
We, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, agree to insure you according to the terms of this
policy based:
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you
chose; and
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations.

3. this policy contains all of the agreements betweei
you and us or any of our agents.
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on th<
declarations page, your statements are:
1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car.
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you no
any member of your household within the past
years has had:
a. vehicle insurance canceled by an insurer; or
b. a license to dnve or vehicle registratioi
suspended, revoked or refused.
3. Use. Your car is used for pleasure and business.

You agree, by acceptance of this policy that
1. the statements in these declarations are your
statements and are true; and
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true;
and

WHEN AND WHERE COVERAGE APPLIES
When Coverage Applies
The coverages you chose apply to accidents and losses that
take place during the policy period
The policy period is shown under "Policy Period" on the
declarations page and is for successive periods of six months
each for which you pay the renewal premium. Payments
must be made on or before the end of the current policy
period The policy period begins and ends at 12:01 A.M.
Standard Time at the address shown on the declarations
page.
Where Coverage Applies
The coverages you chose apply:

L

in the United States of America, its territories an
possessions or Canada; or
2. while the insured vehicle is being shipped betwee
their ports.
The liability, no-fault and physical damage coverages als
apply in Mexico within 50 miles of the United States horde
A physical damage coverage toss in Mexico is determine
on the basis of cost at the nearest United States point.
Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage appli
anywhere in the world.

FINANCED VEHICLES
If a creditor is shown in the declarations, we may pay any
comprehensive or collision loss to:
1. you and, if unpaid, the repairer; or
2. you and such creditor, as its interest may appear,
when we find it is not practical to repair your car;
or
3. the creditor, as to its interest, if your car has been
repossessed.
When we pay the creditor for toss for which you are not
covered, we are entitled to the creditor's right of recovery
against you to the extent of our payment. Our nght of

recovery shall not impair the creditor's nght to recover ti
full amount of its claim.
The coverage for the creditor's interest only is valid until \
terminate it. We will not terminate such coverage becai
of:
1. any act or negligence of the owner or borrower; (
2. a change in the ownership or interest unknown
us, unless the creditor knew of it and failed to I
us within 10 days; or
3. an error in the description of the vehicle.
The date of termination of the creditor's interest will be
least 10 days after the date we mail the termination notio
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REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S DUTIES
[. Notice to Us of an Accident or Loss
The insured must give us or one of our agents written
notice of the accident or bss as soon as reasonably
possible. The notice must give us:
a. your name; and
b. the names and addresses of all persons involved;
and
c. the hour, date, place and facts of the accident or
bss; and
d. the names and addresses of witnesses.

c.

the report will be sent to the person upon written
request. If the person is dead or unable to act, his
or her legal representative shall authorize us to
obtain all medical reports and records.
(1) under the uninsured motor vehicle and
underinsured motor vehicle coverages let us see
the insured car the person occupied in the
accident;

(2) under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage
report a "hit-and-run" accident to the police
within 24 hours and to us within 30 days.
Notice to Us of Qaim or Suit
Failure to give this notice within the time
specified
does not invalidate coverage if:
If a claim or suit is made against an insured, that insured
(a) the person making claim shows it was not
must at once send us every demand, notice or claim
reasonably possible to ^vc the notice
made and every summons or legal process received.
within the prescribed time; and
Other Duties Under the Physical Damage Coverages
(b) the notice is given as soon as reasonably
When there is a bss, you or the owner of the property
possible.
also shall:
d. under the no-fault, uninsured motor vehicle and
a. make a prompt report to the police when the bss
underinsured motor vehicle coverages, send us at
is the result of theft or larceny.
once a copy of all suit papers when the party liable
b. protect the damaged vehicle. We will pay any
for the accident is sued for these damages.
reasonable expense incurred to do it
e. under the no-fault and death, dismemberment and
c. show us the damage, when we ask.
loss of sight coverages, give us proof of claim on
forms we furnish.
d. provide all records, receipts and invoices, or
certified copies of them. We may make copies.
5. Insured's Duty to Cooperate With Us
e. answer questions under oath when asked by
The insured shall cooperate with us and, when asked,
anyone we name, as often as we reasonably ask,
assist us in:
and sign copies of the answers.
a. making settlements;
. Other Duties Under No-Fault, Uninsured Motor Vehicle,
b. securing and giving evidence;
Underinsured
Motor
Vehicle
and
Death,
c. attending, and getting witnesses to attend, hearings
Dismemberment and Loss of Sight Coverages
and trials.
The person making claim also shall:
The insured shall not, except at his or her own cost,
a. give us all the details about the death, injury,
voluntarily:
treatment and other information we need to
a. make any payment or assume any obligation to
determine the amount payable.
others; or
b. be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us
J
as often as we reasonably may require. A copy of
b. incur any expense, other than for first aid to others.

5
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SECTION I - LIABILITY - COVERAGE A
You have this coverage if "A" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations page.
We will:

Who Is an Insured

1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car c
temporary substitute car, insured means:
liable to pay because of:
a. bodily injury to others, and
1. you;
b. damage to or destruction of property including
2. your spouse;
loss of its use,
3. the relatives of the first person named in
caused by accident resulting from the ownership,
declarations;
maintenance or use of your ear; and
4. any other person while using such a car if its m
2. defend any suit against an insured for such damages
within the scope of consent of you or your spot
with attorneys hired and paid by us. We will not
and
defend any suit after we have paid the applicable
5. any other person or organization liable for the
limit of our liability for the accic-jnt which is the
of such a cor by one of the above insureds.
basis of the lawsuit
In addition to the limits of liability, we will pay for an
insured any costs listed below resulting from such accident

When we refer to a non-owned cor, insured moans:

1. the first person named in the declarations;
1. Court costs of any suit for damages.
2. his or her spouse;
2. Interest on damages owed by the insured due to a
3. their relatives; and
judgment and accruing:
4. any person or organiration which does not own
a. after the judgment, and until we pay, offer or
hire the car but is liable for its use by one of
deposit in court, the amount due under this
above persons.
coverage; or
b. before the judgment, where owed by law, but THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR NON-OWN.
CARS:
only on that part of the judgment we pay.
3. Premiums or costs of bonds:
i. IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE Tl
a. to secure the release of an insured's property
"USE" OF YOUR CAR IS OTHER T¥U
attached under a court order. The amount of
"PLEASURE AND BUSINESS"; OR
the bond we pay for shall not be more than our
2. WHILE:
limit of liability; and
a. BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED (
b. required to appeal a decision in a suit for
USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE TH/
damages if we have not paid our limit of
PERSON IS WORKING IN ANY C
liability that applies to the suit; and
BUSINESS; OR
c. up to $250 for each bail bond needed because
b. USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS C
of an accident or traffic violation.
OCCUPATION. This does not apply to
private passenger car driven or occupied by I
We have no duty to furnish or apply for any bonds
first person named in the declarations, his
4. Expense incurred by an insured:
her spouse or their relatives.
a. for loss of wages or salary up to $35 per day if
we ask the insured to attend the trial of a civil
Trailer Coverage
suit.
1. Trailers designed to be pulled by a private passen$
b. for first aid to others at the tune of the accident
car or a utuHty vehicle, except those trailers in 1
c. at our request.
below, are covered while owned or used by
insured.
We have the nght to investigate, negotiate and settle any
claim or suit.
Farm implements and farm wagons are consider
trailers while pulled on public roads by a car
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars
insure for liability
The liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, of a
newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a
These trailers are not described in the declaratw
non-owned car.
and no extra premium is charged.
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2. The following trailers are covered only if described
on the declarations page and extra premium is paid:
a. those trailers designed to be pulled by a private
passenger car or a utility vehicle:
(1) if designed to carry persons; or
(2) while used with a motor vehicle whose use
is shown as "commercial" on the
declarations page (trailers used only for
pleasure use are covered even if not
described and no extra premium paid); or
(3) while used as premises for office, store or
display purposes; or
b. any trailer not designed for use with a private
passenger car or a utility vehicle.
THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A TRAILER
IS USED WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED
OR HIRED BY YOU WHICH WE DO NOT
INSURE FOR LIABILITY COVERAGE.
limits of liability
The ainount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown
On the declarations page under "Limits of Liability —
Coverage A -* Bodily Injury. Each Person, Each
Accident". Uncier "Each Person" is the amount of
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one
person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or
mors persons in the same accident.
The amount of property damage liability coverage is
shown on the declarations page under "Limits of
Liability - Coverage A - Property Damage, Each
Accident".
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally
liable up to these amounts.
The limits of liability are not increased because more
than one person or organization may be an insured.
A motor vehicle and attached trailer are one vehicle.
Therefore, the limits are not increased.
When two or more motor vehicles are insured under
this section the limits apply separately to each.
When Coverage A Does Not Apply
In addition to the limitations of coverage in "Who Is an
Insured" and 'Trailer Coverage":
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
1. WHILE ANY VEHICLE INSURED UNDER
THIS SECTION IS:
a. RENTED TO OTHERS OR USED TO
CARRY PERSONS FOR A CHARGE.
7
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This does not apply to the use on a share
expense basis of:
(1) a private passenger car; or
(2) a uttiity vehicle, if all passengers are riding
in that area of the vehicle designed by the
manufacturer of the vehicle for carrying
passengers.
b. BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR
USED BY ANY PERSON EMPLOYED
OR ENGAGED IN ANY WAY IN A CAR
BUSINESS.
(1) If no other valid and collectible insurance
is applicable, this provision applies to a
motor vehicle business, its officers, agents
and employees, but only to the extent the
limits of liability of this policy exceed the
limits of liability required by Utah law.
(2) This provision in its entirety does not apply
to:
(a) you or your spouse;
(b) my relative;
(c) any resident of your household; or
(d) any agent, employee or partner of you,
your spouse, any relative or such
resident.
This coverage is excess for (c) and (d)
above.
2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO:
a. A FELLOW EMPLOYEE WHILE ON
THE JOB AND ARISING FROM THE
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF A
VEHICLE BY ANOTHER EMPLOYEE IN
THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. You and
your spouse are covered for such injury to a
fellow employee.
b. ANY EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURED
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER
EMPLOYMENT. This does not apply to a
household employee who is not covered or
required to be covered under any workers
compensation insurance.
3. FOR ANY DAMAGES:
a. FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES
MIGHT
BE
LIABLE
FOR
THE
INSUREDS USE OF ANY VEHICLE.
b. TO PROPERTY OWNED BY, RENTED
TO,
IN
CHARGE
OF
OR
TRANSPORTED BY AN INSURED. But
coverage applies to a rented:
(1) residence, or
(2) private garage
damaged by a car we insure.

4
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FOR ANY OBLIGATION OF AN INSURED,
OR HIS OR HER INSURER, UNDER ANY
TYPE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR
DISABILITY OR SIMILAR LAW
FOR LIABILITY ASSUMED BY THE
INSURED UNDER ANY CONTRACT OR
AGREEMENT

Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Law or Fl
Responsibility Law
1

Out-of-State Coverage
If an insured under the liability coverage is in a
state or Canada and, as a non-resident, becomes
to its motor vehicle compulsory insurance, fi
responsibility or similar law
a the policy will be interpreted to gwe the cc
required by the law, and
b the coverage so given replaces any coverage
policy to the extent required by the law j
insured's operation, maintenance or use of
insured under this policy
Any coverage so extended shall be reduced to the
other coverage applies to the accident* In no evci
a. person collect more than once.

2.

Financial Responsibility Law
When certified under any law as proof of
financial responsibility, and while required dun
policy period, this policy shall comply with such
the extent required. The insured agrees to repay
any payment we would not have had to make un<
terms of this policy except for this agreement

If There Is Other Liability Coverage
1

Policies Issued by Us to You
if two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us to
you appl> to the same accident, the total limits of
' liability uftder all such policies shall not exceed that of
the pokr with the highest limit of liability

2

Other Lability Coverage Available From Other
Sources
Subject to item 1, if other vehicle liability coverage
applies, we are liable only for our share of the damages
Our share is the per cent that the limit of liability of this
policy bears to the total of all vehicle liability coverage
applicable to the accident

3

4

Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned Car, Trailer

Duplicate Coverage and Arbitration
If a temporary substitute car, a non-owned car or a trailerIf an insured is or would be held legally liable i
designed for use with a private passenger car or utility damages resulting from bodily injury sustained by any
vehicle has other vehicle liability coverage on it, then this to whom benefits required under no-fault coverage
coverage is excess.
been paid by another insurer, including the W
Compensation Fund of Utah, we will reimburse the
Newly Acquired Car
insurer for the payment, but not in excess o( the a
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE recoverable
IS OTHER VEHICLE LIABILITY COVERAGE The issue of liability and the amount will be decu
ON A NEWL Y ACQUIRED CAR.
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers
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SECTION n - NO-FAULT - COVERAGE P
You have this coverage if "P" with a number beside it appears in the "Coverages * space on the declarations page T " with
a number beside it is your coverage symbol
Check your coverage symbol with the Schedule in the limits of liability for the choice of options you made
(2) ends either
(a) when the insured can perform these
services,
(b) when the insured dies, or
(c) 365 days after the date of the accident,
whichever occurs first

What We Pay
We will pay in accordance with Utaii law for bodily injury
to an insured caused by accident resulting from the
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle:
1. Medical Benefits. This is reimbursement for reasonable
expenses incurred for necessary
a medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance,
X-ray, nursing and rehabilitative services,
b eyeglasses, hearing aids and prosthetic devices, and
c remedial treatment by a recognized religious
method of healing
The most we will pay for all expenses is the amount
shown in the Schedule for your coverage symbol The
most we will pay for expenses for services and products
furnished more than three years after the date of the
accident is $3,000, less any amount paid or payable for
expenses incurred during the first three years

If the insured's disability continues for more than
14 consecutive days after the accident, the penod
begins on *he date of the accident The most we pay
per day is $20
Funeral Benefits* This is reimbursement for reasonable
funeral, buna! or cremation expenses The most we will
pay for an insisted who GJ~S IS the amount shown in the
Schedule for>'^nrcovera0e symbol
4 Survivors' Benefits. Tr s is an amount paid to an
insured's heirs when an msured dies as the result of the
accident The most v*e will pay, if the death occurs
within three years of the accident, is shown in the
Schedule for your coverage symbol If the death occurs
more than three years after the date of the accident, the
most we will pay is $3,000

2. DisabiEty Benefits. This is reimbursement for
a 85% of an insured's actual loss of
(1) gross income from salary wages, tips,
commissions, professional fees and profits from
an individually owned business or farm, or
Definitions
(2) earning capacity
due to that insured's continuous inability to work Insured means
during a penod that
1 you, your spouse or any relative:
(1) begins three days after the date of the accident
a. while occupying a motor vehicle, or
and
b
when a pedestrian, if the bodily injury results from
(2) ends either
physical contact with a motor vehicle; or
(a) when the insured is able to return to his or
2 any other person:
her usual job,
a while occupying your car or a newly acquired car
(b) when the insured dies, or
with the permission of
(c) 52 weeks after the penod begins,
(1) you, your spouse, any relative; or
whichever occurs first
(2) the person dnvmg such car with your
If the insured's inability to work continues for more
permission, or
than two consecutive weeks after the accident, the
b while in Utah, when struck as a pedestrian by your
penod begins on the date of the accident The most
car or a newly acquired car.
we will pay is the amount shown in the Schedule for
your coverage symbol
Motor Vehicle - means
b reasonable expenses incurred for actually rendered
services the insured would have performed for his 1 any self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon
or her household except for the injury These
a highway including trailers and semi-trailers designed
services must be performed during a penod that
for use with such vehicles, and
(1) begins three days after the date of the injury 2 a vehicle which is propelled by electnc power obtamed
and
from overhead wires but not operated upon rails
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It does not include traction engines, road rollers, farm
tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels and well drillers

judge of a court of record in the county m which the
arbitration is pending to select a third one The wntten
decision of any two arbitrators shall be binding on each
party The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness
shall be paid by the party who hired them The cost of
the third arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration
shall be shared equally by both parties The arbitration
shall take place in the county in which the insured
resides unless the parties agree to another place State
court rules governing procedure and admission of
evidence shall be used

Owner — means a, person who
1
2

holds legal title to a motor vehicle; or
has the nght to possession of a motor vehicle under a
security agreement or lease with option to buy

Pedestrian - means a person who is not occupying a motor
vehicle.
When Coverage P Does Not Apply
fflERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY
TO ANY PERSON:

2. Payment of Any Amount Due

'l

We will pay any amount due
a. to the insured, or to any person or organization
providing medical services or ^nxiucts,
b to a parent or guardian, if tk, insured is a minor or
an incompetent person,
c to the surviving spouse; or
d at our option, to a person authorized by law to
receive such payment
Payments will be made on a monthly basis within 35
days after we have proof of the amount due

WHILE OCCUPYING OR WHEN STRUCK BY A
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU OR ANY
RELATIVE WHICH IS NOT YOUR CAR OR A
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
2 WHILE OPERATING YOUR CAR OR A NEWL Y
ACQUIRED CAR:
a WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF YOU OR
YOUR SPOUSE, OR
b IF NOT IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF IT
3 WHOSE CONDUCT CONTRIBUTED TO THE
INJURY UNDER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING If There Is Other Coverage
CIRCUMSTANCES
1. No Duplication
a CAUSING BODILY INJL/RY TO HIMSELF
No person shall recover twice for the same expense or
OR HERSELF INTENTIONALLY, OR
loss
b WHILE COMMITTING A FELONY
2 When you, your spouse or any relative sustains boddy
4 WHILE OPERATING OR OCCUPYING A
injury while occupying or when struck by a motor vehicle
MOTORCYCLE OWNED BY YOUf YOUR
which is not your car or a newly acquired car this
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT
coverage applies
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
a as excess to any similar coverage which applies to
POLICY,
the vehicle as primary coverage, but
5 ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF ANY MOTOR
b only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary
VEHICLE WHILE LOCATED FOR USE AS A
coverage
RESIDENCE OR PREMISES,
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
6 DUE TO WAR OF ANY KIND, OR
excess
7 RESULTING
FROM
THE
HAZARDOUS
a
the total limit of liability shall not exceed the
PROPERTIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
difference between the limit of liability ot the
Settlement of Loss
coverage that applies as primary and the highest
limit of liability of any one of the coverages that
1. Deciding Amount
apply as excess, and
If the insured and we cannot agree, it will be decided by
b we are liable only for our share Our share is that
arbitration upon wntten request ot the insured. Each
per cent of the expenses or loss that the limit of
party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator
liability of this policy for that benefit bears to the
These two shall select a third one If unable to agree on
total limit of liabilitv for that benefit of all no fault
the third one within 30 days, either party may request a
coverage applicable as excess to the accident
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3. If Coverage Is Available From More Than One Insurer

coverage If the refigured premium is greater than what has
Subject to items 1 and 2 above, if two or more insurers been paid, you must pay us the difference
are liable to pay no-fault benefits
Limits of Liability
a the total amount payable from all insurers shall not
exceed the amount payable under the pohcy with 1. The Most We Pay. The most we pay for each insured
the highest limit of liability, and
who sustains bodrfy injury m any one accident shall not
exceed the limit shown in the Schedule applicable to
b we are liable only for our share Our share is that
per cent of the expenses or loss that the limit of
each benefit for your coverage symbol Any amount
liability of this policy for that benefit bears to the
payable shall be reduced by all amounts the insured is
total limit of liability for that oenefit of all no-fault
entitled to receive
coverage applicable to the accident
a under anv worker's compensation, disability or
Constitutionality
similar law, or
b from the United States or any of its agencies
[f a court declares any of the Utah motor vehicle insurance
aw invalid, we may refigure the premium and change the
because of active duty in the military services

I

Schedule
Coverage
Symbol

Medical
Benefits

PI
P2
P3
P4
P5

$ 3000
5,000
10,000
25,000
100,000

Disability Benefits
ss of Income Per Week
$250
250
250
250
300
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Funeral
Benefits

Survlvors,
Benefits

$ 1,500
1,500
1.500
1,500
2,500

$ 3,000
3,000
5,000
5000
10,000

SECTION ffl - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U AND
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U

a. your car, d. temporary substitute car, a newly
acquired car or a trailer attached to such car.

You have this coverage if "U" appears in the "Coverages"
space on the declarations page.

Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of
the consent of you or your spouse; or
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It
has to be driven by the first person named in
the declarations or that person's spouse and
within the scope of the owner's consent.

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident
arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an
uninsured motor vehicle.
Uninsured Motor Vehicle — means:
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance
or use of which is:
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability
at the time of the accident; or
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at
the time of the accident; but
(1) the limits of liability are less than required
by the financial responsibility act of the
state where your car is mainly garaged; or
(2) the insuring company denies coverage or
is or becomes insolvent; or
2. an unidentified "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle
which was the proximate cause of the bodily injury.
The insured must show the existence of the other
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence,
which shall consist of more than the insured's
testimony.

Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry
persons for a charge is not an insured.
any person entitled to recover damages because of
bodily injury to an insured under 1. and 2. above.
Deciding Fault and Amount
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the
insured and us:
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages
from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor
vehicle; and
2. If so, in what amount?

If there is no agreement, these questions will be decided by
arbitration upon written request of the insured. Each party
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two
shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one
within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court
of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor to select a third one. The written decision of any two
vehicle:
arbitrators shall be binding on each party.
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy;
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or
any relative;
3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, a motor
carrier law or any similar law;
4. owned by any government or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies;
5. designed for use mainly otf public roads except
while on public roads; or

The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared
equally by both parties.
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place.
State court rules governing procedure and admission of
evidence shall be used
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or
organization obtained without our written consent.

6. while located for use as premises.

UNDERINSURED
COVERAGE W

Who Is an Insured
Insured - means the person or persons covered by
uninsured motor vehicle coverage.
This is:
1. you, your spouse and your relatives; and
2. any other person while occupying:

MOTOR

VEHICLE

You have this coverage if "W" appears in the "Coverages"
space on the declarations page.
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused
by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use
of an underinsured motor vehicle.
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THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:
1

Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry
persons for a charge is not an insured.
5. any person entided to recover damages because of
bodily injury to an insured under 1 through 4 above.

THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES
THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY
PAYMENT
OF
JUDGMENTS
OR Deciding Fault and Amount
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR
2 SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING Two questions must be decided by agreement between the
PART OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO insured and us:
THE INSURED.
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages
from the owner or driver of the underinsured motor
Underinsured Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle:
vehicle; and
1. the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured
2. If so, in what amount?
or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by
accident; and
arbitration
upon written request of the insured or us.
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability:
Each
party
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator.
a. are less than the amount of the insured's damages;
These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the
or
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of
than the insured to less than the amount of the a court of record m the county in which the arbitration is
pending to select a third one. The written decision of any
insured's damages.
two arbitrators shall be binding on each party.
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be
vehicle:
'*
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared
insured under the liability coverage of this policy;
equally by both parties.
furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the
relative;
owned by any government or any of its political insured resides unless the parties agree to another place.
State court rules governing procedure and admission of
subdivisions or agencies;
evidence shall be used.
designed for use mainly off public roads except while
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or
on public roads;
organization obtained without our written consent.
while located for use as premises; or
Payment
of Any Amount Due - Coverages U and W
defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle' in your policy.
We will pay any amount due:
Who Is an Insured
Insured — means the person or persons covered by
underinsured motor vehicle coverage:
This is:
1.
2.
3.
4.

1. to the insured;
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or
an incompetent person;
3. to the surviving spouse; or
4. at our option, to a person authorized by law to
receive such payment.

Thefirstperson named in the declarations;
his or her spouse;
their relatives; and
limits of Liability - Coverage U
any other person while occupying;
I. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly
page under "Limits of Liability - U — Each Person,
acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car.
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one
the consent of you or your spouse; or
person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It
Under "Each Accident" is the total amdunt of
has to be driven by the first person named in
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each
the declarations or that person's spouse and
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or
within the scope of the owner's consent.
more persons in the same accident.
13
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2. Any amount payable under this coverage shall be
who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily
injury; or
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the
insured:
b. the limits of liability of this coverage.
a. by or for any person or organization who is or may
be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the When Coverage U Does Not Apply
insured; or
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
, b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage.
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH-ANY
shall reduce any amount payable to that person under
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE
the bodily injury liability coverage.
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY.
4. Any amount paid or payable under
2.
FOR BODILYINJURYTO AN INSURED:
a. the no-fault coverage; or
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY
similar law
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR
will not be paid for again as damages under this
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
this coverage.
POLICY.
5* The limits of liability are not increased because:
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS:
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR
or
DISABILITY
BENEFITS
INSURANCE
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the
COMPANY.
accident.
b. A
SELF-INSURER
UNDER
ANY
Limits of Liability — Coverage W
WORKER'S
COMPENSATION,
OR*
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW.
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations
, c. ANY
GOVERNMENTAL
BODY
OR
page under "Limits of Liability-— W — Each Person,
AGENCY.
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one When Coverage W Does Not Apply
person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR
more persons in the same accident.
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY
2. Any amount paid or payable under:
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND
a. the no-fault coverage; or
THEREBY
IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits or
OUR PAYMENTS.
similar law
will not be paid for again as damages under this 2. FOR BODILY INJURYTO ANY INSURED:
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of
this coverage.
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR
shall reduce any amount payable to that person for
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT
bodily injury under the liability coverage.
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
4. The limits of liability are not increased because:
POLICY.
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy;
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS:
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR
accident; or
DISABILITY
BENEFITS
INSURANCE
COMPANY.
c. more than one underinsured motor vehicle is
involved in the same accident.
b. A
SELF-INSURER
UNDER
ANY
WORKER'S
COMPENSATION,
OR
5. The most we pay will be the lesser of:
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW.
a. the difference between the amount of the insured's
damages for bodily injury, and the amount paid to
c. ANY
GOVERNMENTAL
BODY
OR
the insured by or for any person or organization
AGENCY.
14
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4.

FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES OR INTEREST
AWARDED TO OR CLAIMED BY THE
INSURED.
5 FOR ANY PERSON WHOSE CLAIM FOR
BODILY INJURY ARISES OUT OF BODILY
INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANOTHER PERSON.
6. FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED
BY, ON BEHALF OF, OR AWARDED TO THE
INSURED.

If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved,
the number of persons covered or claims made, vehicles
or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the
limit of liability for uninsured motor vehicle coverage
shall not be added to or stacked upon limits for such
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine
the amount of coverage available to an insured injured
in any one accident.
If the insured sustains bodily injury and other uninsured
motor vehicle coverage applies:
a. ' the insured must elect one policy under which to
make a claim; and
b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY DOES
NOT APPLY IF THE INSURED ELECTS ANY
OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE UNDER WHICH TO MAKE A
CLAIM.
3. THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE
IS OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian and
other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies:
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the
highest limit of liability; and

b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident.
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your
car, and your car is described on the declarations page
of another policy providing underinsured motor vehicle
coverage:
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the
highest limit of liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all such
underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to
the accident.
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a
vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any relative,
this coverage applies:
a. as excess to any underinsured motor vehicle
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary
coverage, but
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary
coverage.
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total limit of liability shall not exceed the
difference between the limit of liability of the
coverage that applies as primary and the highest
limit of liability of any one of the coverages that
apply as excess; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the
accident.
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE
IS OTHER UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.

SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES
Loss - means, when used in this section, each direct and
accidental loss of or damage to
1
2
3
4

your cat;
its equipment which is common to the use of your
car as a, vehicle, or
clothes and luggage insured, and
a detachable living quarters attached or removed
from your cor for storage Detachable living
quarters includes its body and items securely fixed
in place as a permanent part of the body You must
have told us about the living quarters before the bss
and paid any extra premium needed

COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE D. You have this
coverage if' D" appears in the "Coverages" space on the
Geclarations page If a deductible applies, the amount is
shown by the number beside " D "

Clothes and Luggage Coverages

Comprehensive and Colhsiot

We will pay for bss to clothes and luggage owned by the
first person named in the declarations, his or her spouse, anc
their relatives. These items have to be in or on your car
Your car has to be covered under this policy for
1

2

Comprehensive, and the bss caused by fire
lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion
earthquake or theft If the bss is due to theft,
YOUR ENTIRE CAR MUST HAVE BEEN
STOLEN, or
Collision, and the bss caused by collision.

We will pay up to $200 for bss to clothes and luggage in
excess of any deductible amount shown for comprehensive
or collision $200 is the most we will pay in any one
occurrence even though more than one person his a bss.
1 Loss to Your Car We will pay for loss to your car This coverage is excess over any other coverage
EXCEPT LOSS BY COLLISIONbut only for the Limit of Liability - Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible
The limit of our liability for bss to property or any part of
amount, if any
it is the lower of
Breakage of glass, or bss caused by missiles, falling
objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake
1 the actual cash value or
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or
2 the cost of repair or replacement
vandalism, not or civil commotion, is payable
under this coverage Loss due to hitting or being Actual cash value is determined by the market value, age
hit by a bird or an animal is payable under this and condition, at the time the bss occurred Any deductible
coverage
amount that applies is then subtracted The cost of repair
2 We will repay you for transportation costs if your or replacement is based upon
car is stolen We will pay up to $16 per day for the
1 the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us, or
period that begins 48 hours after you tell us of the
theft. The period ends when we offer to pay for
2 the lower of
bss.
a. a competitive bid approved by us, or
b an estimate written based upon the prevailing
COLLISION - 80% - COVERAGE F. You have this
competitive price The prevailing competitive
coverage if **F' appears in the 'Coverages" space on the
price means labor rates, parts paces and
declarations page
material prices charged by a substantial
We will pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that
number of the repair facilities in the area where
amount of bss to your car caused by collision. If the collision
the car is to be repaired as determined by a
is with another motor vehicle insured by us, we will pay
survey made by us If you ask, we will identify
100% of the bss.
some facilities that will perform the repairs at
the prevailing competitive price
COLLISION ~ COVERAGE G You have this coverage
if "G" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations
page The deductible amount is shown by the number beside Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted
*G"
Settlement of Loss - Comprehensive and Collision
We will pay for bss to your car caused by collision but only Coverages
for the amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible We have the nght to settle a bss with you or the owner of
amount If the colSswn is with another motor vehicle the property m one of the following ways
insured with us, you do not pay your deductible if it is $100
or lebS as we pay it
1 pay up to the actual cash value
CoUaswn - means your car upset or hit or was hit by a
2 pay to repair or replace the property or part with
vehicle or other object
like kind and quality If the repair or replacement

a.

repay you up to $16 per day when you rent a
car from a car rental agency or garage; OR
b. pay you $10 per day if you do not rent a car
while your car is not usable

results in better than like kind and quality, you must
pay for the amount of the betterment;
3. return the stolen property and pay for any damage
due to the theft; or
4. take the property at an agreed value; but it cannot
be abandoned to us.

due to a loss to your car which would be payable
under coverage D, F or G.

If we can pay the loss under either comprehensive or
collision, we will pay under the coverage where you collect
the most.

This applies during a period starting:
a. when your car cannot run due to the bss; or
b. if your car can run, when you leave it at the
shop for agreed repairs;

When there is loss to your car, clothes and luggage in the
same occurrence, any deductible will be applied first to the
bss to your car. You pay only one deductible.

and ending:
a. when it has been repaired or replaced, or
b. (1) when we offer to pay for the loss, if your
car is repairable, or
(2) five days after we offer to pay for the loss,
if:
(a) your car was stolen and not recovered,
or
(b) we declare it a total loss,
whichever'comes first.

EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE - COVERAGE H.
You have this coverage if "H" appears in the "Coverages"
space on the declarations page.
We will pay the fair cost you incur for your car for
1. mechanical labor up to one hour at the place of its
breakdown;
2. towing to the nearest place where the necessary
repairs can be made during regular business hours
if it will not run;
3. towing it out if it is stuck on or immediately next to
a public highway;
4. delivery of gas, oil, loaned battery, or change of tire.
WE DO NOT PAY FOR THE COST OF
THESE ITEMS.

Any car rent payable under this coverage is
REDUCED TO THE EXTENT IT IS
PAYABLE UNDER COMPREHENSIVE.
2. Travel Expenses. If your car cannot run due to a
loss which would be payable under coverage D, F
or G more than 50 miles from home, we will repay
you for expenses incurred by you, your spouse and
any relative for:
a. Commercial transportation fares to continue to
your destination or home.
b. Extra meals and lodging needed when the loss
to your car causes a delay enroute. The
expenses must be incurred between the time of
the bss and your arrival at your destination or
home or by the end of the fifth day, whichever
occurs first
c. Meals, lodging and commercial transportation
fares incurred by you or a person you choose to
drive your car from the place of repair to your
destination or home.
3. Rental Car - Repayment of Deductible Amount
Expense. We will repay the expense of any
deductible amount you are required to pay the
owner under comprehensive or collision coverage
in effect on a substitute car rented from a car rental
agency or garage.

CAR RENTAL EXPENSE - COVERAGE R. You have
this coverage if "K" appears in the "Coverages" space on
the declarations page.
We will repay you up to SI0 per day when you rent a car
from a car rental agency or garage due to a loss to your car
which would be payable under coverage D, F or G, starting:
1. when it cannot run due to the loss; or
2. if it can run, when you leave it at the shop for
agreed repairs;
and ending when:
1. it has been repaired or replaced, or
2. we offer to pay for the loss, or
3. you incur 30 days rent,
whichever comes first.
Any car rent payable under coverage R is REDUCED TO
THE
EXTENT IT IS PAYABLE
UNDER
COMPREHENSIVE.
CAR RENTAL AND TRAVEL EXPENSES
COVERAGE RL You have this coverage if W*R1" appears
1
m the "Coverages ' space on the declarations page.
I.

Total Amount of Expenses Payable — Coverage Rl
L

Car Rental Expense. We will:
17
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The most we will pay for the total of the "Car Rental
Expense1' and "Rental Car - Repayment of
Deducuble Amount Expense" incurred m any one
occurrence is $400.

2. The most we will pay for 'Travel Expenses" incurred
by all persons in any one occurrence is $400

When Coverages D, F, G, H, R and Rl Do Not Apply
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR

Trailer Coverage

1

A NON-OWNED CAR:
a. IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE THE
"USE" OF YOUR CAR IS other than pleasure
Your trailer is covered
and business,
a when it is described on the declarations page of the
b WHILE BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR
policy, and
USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE THAT
b for the coverages shown as applying to it
PERSON IS WORKING IN ANY CAR
BUSINESS; OR
2 Non-Owned Trailer or Detachable Living Quarters
c WHILE USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS
Any physical damage coverage in force on your car
OR OCCUPATION This does not apply to a
applies to a non-owned
private passenger car driven or occupied by the first
person named in the declarations, his or her spouse
a trailer, if it is designed for use with a private
or their relatives.
passenger car, or
2
ANY
VEHICLE WHILE
b detachable living quarters unit
a
RENTED
TO OTHERS OR USED TO CARRY
used by the first person named in the declarations, his
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE This does not
or her spouse or their relatives.
apply to the use on a share expense basis, OR
The most we will pay under the comprehensive or
bSUBJECT TO ANY LIEN, RENTAL OR
collision coverage for a bss to such non-owned trailer
SALES AGREEMENT NOT SHOWN IN THE
or unit is $500
DECLARATIONS
A non-owned trailer or detachable living quarters unit 3 LOSSTO ANY VEHICLE DUE TO
is one that
a TAKING BY ANY GOVERNMENTAL
a is not owned by or registered in the name of
AUTHORITY,
(1) yoUy your spouse', any relative;
b WAR OF ANY KIND,
(2) any other person residing in the same
c AND LIMITED TO WEAR AND TEAR,
household as you, your spouse or any relative;
FREEZING,
MECHANICAL
OR
or
ELECTRICAL BREAKDOWN OR FAILURE
This does not apply when the bss is the result of a
(3) an employer ofyou, your spouse or any relative;
theft covered by this policy Nor does it apply to
and
emergency road service, OR
b has not been used by, rented by or in the possession
d CONVERSION,
EMBEZZLEMENT
OR
of you, your spouse or any relative during any part
of each of the preceding 21 days, and
SECRETION BY ANY PERSON WHO HAS
THE VEHICLE DUE TO ANY LIEN,
c is used by you, your spouse or any relative and such
RENTAL OR SALES AGREEMENT
persons have not used or rented any non-owned
trailer or detachable living quarters unit for more 4 TIRES unless
than 45 days in the 365 days preceding the date of
a stolen, or damaged by fire or vandalism, or
the accident or loss.
b other loss covered by this section happens at the
same time
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars
5 TAPES OR DISCS FOR RECORDING OR
The coverages in this section you have on your car extend to
REPRODUCING SOUND
a loss to a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or
a non-owned car. These coverages extend to a non-owned car 6 ANY RADAR DETECTOR
while it is driven by or in the custody of an insured.
If There Is Other Coverage
Insured — as used in this provision means
1 Policies Issued by Us to You
1 the first person named in the declarations,
If two or more vehicle policies issued by us to you apply
2 his or her spouse; or
to the same loss or occurrence, we will pay under the
3 their relatives.
policy with the highest limit
1

Owned Trailer
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4. Newly Acquired Car
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY IF
THERE IS SIMILAR COVERAGE ON A NEWLY
ACQUIRED CAR.

Coverage Available From Other Sources

^E THE
i pleasure
ZED OR
I THAT
Y CAR
JSINESS
sply to a
y the first
ler spouse

CARRY
does not
OR
AL OR
IN THE

[ENTAL

TEAR,
OR
JLURE.
esult of a
apply to

r

OR
IO HAS
LIEN,

Subject to item 1, if other coverage applies to the loss
or expenses, we will pay only our share. Our share is the
per cent the limit of liability of this policy bears to the
No Benefit to Bailee
total of all coverage that applies.
These coverages shall not benefit any carrier or other bailee
Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned Car, Trailer
for hire liable for loss.
If a temporary substitute cary a non-owned car or trader Two or More Vehicles
designed for use with a private passenger car has other If two or more of your cars are insured for the same
coverage, the coverage applies separately to each.
coverage on it, then this coverage is excess.

SECTION V - DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT AND LOSS OF SIGHT COVERAGES
SCHEDULE

DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT AND LOSS OF SIGHT
- COVERAGES

If amount under S in
the declarations is:

If "S" is shown in the "Coverages'* space on the declarations
page each insured has the coverage.

$5,000
We will pay the amount shown in the schedvb that applies
for death, or loss, caused by accident. The ins .red has to be Death
$5,000
occupying or be struck by a land motor vehicle or trailer. Loss of:
The death or loss must be the direct result of the accident hands; feet; sight of eyes; one
hand & one foot; or one hand or
and not due to any other cause. The death or loss must
one foot & sight of one eye
5,000
occur within 90 days of the accident.
one hand or one foot; or sight of
one eye
2,500
Insured - means a person listed under "Persons Insured thumb
&
finger
on
one
hand;
or
Coverage S" on the declarations page.
three lingers
1,500
any two fingers
1,000
Loss - means the loss of:
1. the foot or hand, cut off through or above the ankle
or wrist; or
2. the whole thumb or finger; or

$10,000
$10,000

10,000
5,000
3,000
2,000

Payment of Any Amount Due
We will pay any amount due:
1. to the insured;
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or
an incompetent person;
3. to the surviving spouse; or
4. at our option, to any person or organization
authorized by law to receive such payment

3. all sight.
rcs at the

The Most We Pay

JG OR

The most we will pay because of the death of, or loss to, the
insured, except as provided below, is shown under
"Amounts" next to his or her name on the declarations
page.
Any payment made is to its extent a complete discharge of
The amount shown in the schedule for death or loss is our obligations. We are not responsible for the way the
money is used.
doubled for an insured who, at the time of the accident, is
x*saig the vehicle's complete restraint system as Autopsy

IQVL apply

mder the

recommended by the vehicle's manufacturer.

We have the right to have an autopsy made where it is not
forbidden by law.

If the insured dies as a result of this accident any payment
made or due for loss reduces the amount of the death When Coverage S Does Not Apply
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY TO:
payment
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AN INSURED
WHILE ON THE JOB,
OPERATING OCCUPYING, LOADING OR
UNLOADING
d AN EMERGENCY VEHICLE OR
b A VEHICLE USED IN THE INSURED'S
BUSINESS OR JOB

(2) MILITARY VEHICLE
3

But 1 b does not apply if the vehicle is
(1) a private passenger car or school bus, or
(2) of the pickup or van type, with a Gross Vehicle
Weight of 10,000 pounds or less, while not used
for delivery
4
2

AN INSURED WHILE
a ON THE JOB IN ANY CAR BUSINESS; OR
b OCCUPYING ANY
(1) VEHICLE WHILE BEING USED IN A
RACE, OR

20
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AN INSURED WHILE OCCUPYING OR
THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A MOTOR
VEHICLE OR TRAJLER
a THAT
RUNS
ON
RAILS
OR
CRAWLER-TREADS,
b DESIGNED FOR USE MAINLY OFF
PUBLIC ROADS WHILE OFF PUBLIC
ROADS, OR
c LOCATED FOR USE AS PREMISES
THE DEATH OF OR LOSS TO AN INSURED
DUE TO
a. DISEASE except pus forming infection due to
bodily vnj ay received in the accident, or
b SUICIDE OR ATTEMPTED SUICIDE WHILE
SANE OR INSANE, OR
c WAR OF ANY KIND

CONDITIONS
OR
OTOR
OR
OFF
JBLIC

VRJED

due to
VH1LE

Policy Changes
3.
- Policy Terms. The terms of this policy may be
changed or waived only by:
(1) an endorsement signed by one of our executive
officers; or
(2) the revision of this policy form to give broader
coverage without an extra charge. If any
coverage you carry is changed to give broader
coverage, we will give you the broader coverage
without the issuance of a new policy as of the
date we make the change effective.
b. Change of Interest. No change of interest in this
policy is effective unless we consent in writing.
However, if you die, we will protect as named
insured, except under death, dismemberment and
loss of sight coverage:
(1) your surviving spouse;
(2) any person with proper custody of your car, a
itewly acquired car or a temporary substitute car
until a legal representative is qualified; and then
(3) the legal representative while acting within the
scope of his or hex duties.

Our Right to Recover Our Payments

a

Policy notice requirements are met by mailing the
notice to the deceased named insured's last known
address,
c Consent of Beneficiary. Consent of the beneficiary
under death, dismemberment and loss of sight
coverage is not needed to cancel or change the
policy.
d- Joint and Individual Interests. When there are two
or more named insureds, each acts for all to cancel
or change the policy.
Suit Against Us

a.

Death, dismemberment and loss of sight coverage
paytnents are not recoverable by us.
b. Under uninsured motor vehicle coverage:
CO We are subrogated to the extent of our
payments to the proceeds of any settlement the
injured person recovers from any party liable
for the bodily injury.
(2) if the person to or for whom we have made
payment has not recovered from the party at
fault, he or she shall:
(a) keep these rights in trust for us;
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and
(c) when we ask, take action through our
representative to recover our payments.
\Ve are to be repaid our payments, costs and
fees of collection out of any recovery.
c. Und^r no-fault coverage we are entitled to recover*
our payments in accord with Utah law.
d. Und^r underinsured motor vehicle coverage:
CO tye are entitled, to the extent of our payments,
to the proceeds of any settlement the insured
recovers from any party liable for the bodily
injury, other than payments from bodily injury
KabiSfy bonds or policies made prior to our
Payment.
(2) if the insured has not been fully compensated
for the bodily injury by the party at fault and
We make payment for the bodily injury, the
^Hsured shall:
(&) keep these rights in trust for us:
(b) execute any legal papers we need; and'
fc) when we ask, take action through our
representative to recover the amount of
our payments.

There is no right of action against us:
&• until all the terms of this policy have been met; and
b. under the liability coverage, until the amount of
We are to be repaid our payments, costs and
damages an insured is legally liable to pay has been
fees of collection out of any such recovery,
finally determined by:
e. Under all other coverages the right of recovery of
any Party we pay passes to us. Such party shall:
(1) judgment after actual trial, and appeal if any;
or
(1) Aot hurt our rights to recover; and
(2) agreement between the insured, the claimant
(2) help us get our money back.
and us.
4 Cancellation
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or his or
How You, May Cancel. You may cancel your policy by
bsr estate shall not refiere as of our obligations
notifying v^ fn writing of the date to cancel, which must
be later tl\ a n the date you mail or deliver it to us. We
c
- under all other coverages until the earlier of:
may waive these requirements by confirming the date
(1) 60 days after we receive proof of loss;
and time 0)f cancellation to you in writing.
(2) our waiver of proof of loss: or
How and When We May Cancel. We may cancel your
(3) our denial of full payment.
policy by wntten notice, mailed to your last known
21
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address. The notice shall give the date cancellation is
effective. The mailing of it shall be sufficient proof of
notice.

5. Renewal

If we mail or deliver a notice of cancellation to you
during the first 59 days following the policy effective
date, the canceflation notice will be mailed to you at
least 10 days before the cancellation effective date.

Unless we mail or deliver to you a notice of cancellation
or a notice of our intention not to renew the policy, we
" agree to renew the policy for the next policy period
upon your payment of the renewal premium when due.
It is agreed that the renewal premium will be based
upon the rates in effect, the coverages carried, the
applicable limits of liability, deductibles and other
elements that affect the premium that apply at the time
of renewal

After the policy has been in force for more than 59 days,
any notice of cancellation will be mailed to you at least
a, 10 days before the cancellation effective date if the
Other elements that may affect your premium include,
cancellation is because you did not pay the
but are not limited to:
premium; or
a. drivers of your cor and their ages and marital status;
b. 30 days before the cancellation effective date if the
canceflation is because of any other reason.
b. your cor and its use;
Unless we mail or deliver a notice of cancellation to you
c. eligibility for discounts or other premium credits;
within 59 days of the policy effective date, we will not
d. applicability of a surcharge based either on accident
cancel your policy before the end of the current policy
history, or on other factors.
period unless:
A notice of our intention to not renew will be mailed to
a. you fail to pay the premium when due; or
your last known address at least 30 days before the end
b. you or any other person who usually drives your cor
of the current policy period. The mailing of it shall be
have had his or her driver's license under
sufficient proof of notice.
suspension or revocation:
6. Change of Residence
(1) during the policy period; or
When we receive notice that the location of principal
(2) if the policy is renewed;
garaging of the vehicle described on the declarations
(a) during the current policy period; or
page has been changed, we have the right to recalculate
(b) 180 days just before its latest renewal date.
the premium based on the coverages and rates
applicable in the new location. When the change of
Return of Unearned Premium. ]fyou cancel, premium
location is from one state to another and you are a risk
may be earned on a short rate basis. If we cancel,
still acceptable to us at the time you notify us of the
premium will be earned on a pro-rata basis. Any
change, we shall replace this policy with the policy form
unearned premium may be returned at the time we
currently in use in the new state of garaging. The word
cancel or within a reasonable time thereafter. Delay in
the return of unearned premium does not affect the
"state" means one of the United States of America, the
cancellation.
District of Columbia or a province of Canada.
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Membership. The membership fees set out in this policy,
which are in addition to the premiums, are not
returnable but entitle the first insured named in the
declarations to insure one vehicle for any applicable
coverage, and to insurance for any other coverage for
which said fees were paid so long as:
a. this company continues to write such coverages;
b. the vehicle to be insured meets the eligibility
requirements of the company; and
c. the insured remains a risk desirable to the company.
While this policy is in force, the first insured named in
the declarations is entitled to vote at all meetings of

members and to receive dividends the Board of
Directors in its discretion may declare in accordance
with reasonable classifications and groupings of
policyholders established by such Board.
2. No Contingent liability. This policy is non-assessable.
3. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the members
of the company shall be held at its home office at
Bloomington, Illinois, on the second Monday of June
at the hour of 10:00 A.M., unless the Board of Directors
shall elect to change the time and place of such meeting,
in which case, but not otherwise, due notice shall be
mailed each member at the address disclosed in this
policy at least 10 days prior thereto.

In Witness Whereof, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed by its
President and Secretary at Bloomington, Illinois.
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WHAT IT IS AND WHERE YOU CAN FIND rr - THE INDEX

Page No.
5

Reporting a Claim - Insured's Duties - What to do if you have an acadent, claim or are sued.

3

Defined Words

4

Declarations Continued

4

When and Where Your Coverage Applies

4

Financed Vehicles - Coverage for Creditor
Coverages

6
9
12
12
16
16
16
17
17
17
19

A - Liability - When there is damage to others
P - No-Fault — When there is bodify injury to an insured as the result of the use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle.
U - Uninsured Motor Vehicle - When the other car or driver is not insured
W — Underinsured Motor Vehicle - When the other car or driver is undennsured.
D — Comprehensive — When your car is damaged except by collision or upset Any
deductible amount is shown by the number beside " D " on the declarations page.
F — Collision ~ 80% — When your car is damaged by collision or upset
G — Collision - When your car is damaged by collision or upset. The deductible is shown by
the number beside U G" on the declarations page
H — Emergency Road Service — When your car breaks down or needs a tow
R - Car Rental Expense — When you need to rent a car because of damage to your car,
Rl - Car Rental and Travel Expenses - When you need to rent a car and pay extra travel
expenses because of damage to your car.
S — Death, Dismemberment and Loss of Sight - Pays for death of or certain injuries to
persons named
Conditions

21
21
21
21
22
22

1
2
3
4
5
6
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Mutual Conditions

Policy Changes
Suit Against Us
Our Right To Recover Our Payments
Cancellation
Renewal
Change of Residence

Policy Form 9844 3

6885EE * MENDMENT OF UNINSURED MO" R VEHICLE - COVERAGE U
.ND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEH. JLE - COVERAGE W
This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain the
same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different effective date
is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page.
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois,
or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown by the company's
name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part.
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that SECTION III - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
- COVERAGE U AND UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W of your policy is changed
as follows:
1. Item 2 under When Coverage U Does Not Apply
b. we are liable only for our share. Our
share is that per cent of the damages
is changed to read:
that the limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total of all such unin2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO ANY INsured motor vehicle coverage
SURED WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU,
applicable to the accident.
YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE
IF IT IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS
2. If the insured sustains bodily injury while
COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY.
occupying a vehicle not owned by you,
your spouse or any relative, this coverage
2. Item 2 under When Coverage W Does Not Apply
applies:
is changed to read:
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehiFOR BODILY INJURY TO ANY INcle coverage which applies to the vehiSURED WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR
cle as primary coverage, but
VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds
NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE
the primary coverage.
UNDER THIS POLICY.
If coverage under more than one policy
3. The provision titled If There Is Other Uninsured
applies as excess:
Motor Vehicle Coverage is changed to read:
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle
Coverage
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a
pedestrian, or while occupying your car
and your car is described on the declarations page of another policy providing uninsured motor vehicle coverage:
a.

the total limits of liability under all
such coverages shall not exceed that of
the coverage with the highest limit of
liability; and

a.

the total limit of liability shall not exceed the difference between the limit of
liability of the coverage that applies as
primary and the highest limit of liability of any one of the coverages that
apply as excess; and

b.

we are liable only for our share. Our
share is that per cent of the damages
that the limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total of all uninsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable as
excess to the accident.

2. II ^ insured sustains bodily injury as a
pedestrian or while occupying a vehicle not
owned by the insured or a relative and other
underinsured motorist coverage applies:

3. THISC ,£RAGE DOES NOT APPLY
IF THERE IS OTHER UNINSURED
MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE ON A
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
4. The provision titled If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage is changed to
read:

a.

1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles
involved, the number of persons covered or
claims made, vehicles or premiums shown
in the policy or premiums paid, the limit of
liability for underinsured motor vehicle
coverage may not be added to or stacked
upon limits for such coverage applying to
other motor vehicles to determine the
amount of coverage available to an insured
injured in any one accident.

the insured must elect one policy under
which to make a claim; and

b. COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY
DOES NOT APPLY IF RECOVERY
IS AVAILABLE UNDER THE UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
COVERAGE OF THE ELECTED
POLICY.
3. THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF
THERE IS OTHER UNDERINSURED
MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE ON A
NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.

President
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o082P AMENDATORY ENDORSED <T

This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain
the same and apply to this endorsement It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different
effective date is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page.
Issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of Bloomington,
Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bloomington, Illinois, as shown
by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a part.
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed your policy is changed as follows:
1. The definition of non-owned car under
DEFINED WORDS is changed to read:

increased by an additional 21 days for
each such additional policy.

Non-Owned Car - means a car not owned,
registered or leased by:

A non-owned car must be a car in the lawful
possession of the person operating it

1. you, your spouse;
2. any relative unless at the time of die
accident'or tow:
a. the car currently is or has within the
last 30 days been insured for (lability
coverage; and
b. the driver is an insured who does not
own or lease the car;
3. any other person residing in the same
household as you, your spouse or any
relative; or
4. an employer of you, your spouse or any
relative.
Non-owned car does not include a:
1. rented car while it is used in connection
with the insured's employment or business; or
2. car which has been operated or rented by
or in the possession of an insured during
any part of each of the last 21 or more
consecutive days. If the insured is an
insured under one or more other car policies issued by us, the 21 day limit is

2. REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S
DUTIES
a. The following provision is added to item 4:
The person making claim also shall answer
questions under oath when asked by anyone
we name, as often as we reasonably ask, and
sign copies of the answers.
b. Item 4b is changed to read:
The person making claim also shall:
b. be examined by physicians chosen
and paid by us as often as we reasonably may require. A copy of the
report will be sent to the person upon
written request. The person, or his or
her legalrepresentativeif the person
is dead or unable to act, shall authorize us to obtain all medical reports
and records.
3. SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COVERAGES
a- The provision titled Limit of Liability Comprehensive and Collision Coverages is
changed to rea±
6082P

Th
it of our liability for loss to proper^ ^i any part of it is the lower of:
1. the actual cash value; or

/e have therightto settle a loss with you
or the owner of the property in one of the
following ways:
1. pay the agreed upon actual cash
value of the property at the time
of the loss in exchange for the
damaged property. If the owner
and we cannot agree on the actual
cash value, either party may
demand an appraisal as described
below. If the owner keeps the
damaged property, we will
deduct its value after the loss
from our payment The damaged
property cannot be abandoned to
us;

2. the cost ofrepairor replacement
Actual cash value is determined by the
market value, age and condition at the
time the loss occurred Any deductible
amount that applies is then subtracted.
The cost of repair or replacement is based
upon one of the following:
1. the cost of repair or replacement
agreed upon by you and us;
2. a competitive bid approved by us;
or

2. pay to:

3. an estimate written based upon
the prevailing competitive price.
The prevailing competitive price
means prices charged by a
majority of the repair market in
the area where the car is to be
repaired as determined by a survey made by us. If you ask, we
will identify some facilities that
will perform the repairs at the
prevailing competitive price.
We will include in the estimate
parts sufficient to restore the
vehicle to its pre-loss condition.
You agree with us that such parts
may include either parts furnished by the vehicle's manufacturer or parts from other sources
including non-original equipment manufacturers.

a. repair the damaged property
or part, or
b. replace the property or part.
If the repair or replacement
results in betterment, you must
pay for the amount of betterment;
or
3. return the stolen property and pay
for any damage due to the theft
Appraisal under item 1 above
shall be conducted according to
the following procedure. Each
party shall select an appraiser.
These two shall select a third appraiser. The written decision of
any two appraisers shall be binding. The cost of the appraiser
shall be paid by the party who
hired him or her. The cost of the
third appraiser and other appraisal
expenses shall be shared equally
by both parties. We do not waive
any of our rights by agreeing to an

Any deductible amount that applies is
then subtracted
b. The first paragraph under Settlement of Loss
- Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
is changed to read:
2

6082P

appraisal. We have tl
jht to
move the damaged property, at
our expense, to reduce storage
costs during the appraisal process.

has not been used * ited by or in
the possession ofyou, your spouse or
any relative during any part of each
of the last 21 or more consecutive
days. If you are insured by one or
more other car policies issued by us,
the 21 day limit is increased by an
additional 21 days for each such
additional policy; and

The Settlement of Loss provision for
comprehensive and collision coverages
incorporates the Limit of Liability provision of those coverages.
c. Trailer Coverage

c. is not rented and used in connection

Items b and c under "A non-owned trailer or
detachable living quarters unit is one that:**
are changed to read:

with the employment or business of
you, your spouse or any relative.

d^o^sP^wvV.y,.
President
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>R AMENDMENT OF DEFINED WOT
NO-FAULT — COVERAGE P

SAND

This endorsement is a part of your policy. Except for the changes it makes, all other terms of the policy remain the
same and apply to this endorsement. It is effective at the same time as your policy unless a different effective date
is shown for the endorsement on the Declarations Page.
This endorsement is issued by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY of
Bloomington, Illinois, or the STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY of Bioomington, Illinois, as
shown by the company's name on the policy of which this endorsement is a pan.
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that your policy is changed as follows:
company that describes the car on
1. DEFINED WORDS
its declarations page.
The definition of newly acquired car is changed to
read:
You or your spouse may apply for a policy
that will provide coverage beyond the 30th
Newly Acquired Car - means a replacement
day for the additional car. Such policy will
car or an additional car.
be issued only if both you and the vehicle
Replacement Car- means a car purchased
are eligible for coverage at the time of
by or leased to you or your spouse to replace
application.
your car. This policy will only provide
coverage for the replacement car it you or 2. SECTION II - NO-FAULT - COVERAGE P
your spouse:
When Coverage P Does Not Apply
1. tell us about it within 30 days after
1. Item 1 is deleted.
its delivery to you or your spouse;
and
2. The following provision is added:
2. pay us any added amomr due.
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER
Additional Car - means an addec car purTHIS POLICY FOR BODILY INJURY
chased by or leased to you or your spouse.
TO ANY PERSON WHO IS INJURED:
This policy will only provide coverage for
a. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR
the additional car if:
VEHICLE WHICH IS:
1. it is a private passenger car and we
(1) OWNED BY OR FURNISHED
insure all other private passenger
FOR THE REGULAR USE OF
cars; or
YOU OR ANY RELATIVE; AND
2. it is other than a.private passenger
car and we insure all cars
(2) NOT INSURED FOR NOFAULT COVERAGE UNDER
owned by you or your spouse on the date of
THIS POLICY.
its delivery to you or your spouse.
b. WHEN STRUCK BY A MOTOR
This policy provides coverage for the adVEHICLE WHICH IS:
ditional car only until the earlier of:
1. 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day after the
(1) OWNED BY THE INJURED
delivery of the car to you or your
PERSON; AND
spouse; or
(2) NOT INSURED FOR NO2. the effective date and time of a
FAULT COVERAGE UNDER
policy issued by us or any other
THIS POLICY.

c S S h j a o ^ ^ u \ V 9t
President
6093R

